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1 
THE MARITAL WEALTH GAP 
Erez Aloni 
Abstract: Married couples are wealthier than people in all other family structures. The top 
10% of wealth holders are, in great proportion, married. Even among the wealthiest 
households, married couples hold significantly more wealth than others. The Article identifies 
this phenomenon as the “Marital Wealth Gap,” and critiques the role of diverse legal 
mechanisms in creating and maintaining it. Marriage also contributes to the concentration of 
wealth because marriage patterns are increasingly assortative: wealth marries wealth. The law 
entrenches or even exacerbates these class-based marriage patterns by erecting structural 
barriers that hinder people from meeting across economic strata. 
How can the state restructure the law to alleviate the marital wealth gap? The Article 
proposes a fundamental shift in the way the state treats wealth and family status. It advances a 
theory grounded in transformative “recognition and redistribution” that decentralizes 
marriage’s monopoly on wealth-related benefits and simultaneously aims to reduce wealth 
concentration among the richest households. Principally, since marriage is the preserve of the 
well-off, the state should decouple wealth benefits from marriage. At the same time, it should 
combat the structures that enable wealth concentration among affluent married couples, 
thereby dismantling the architecture that supports the marital wealth gap. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Outward conditions oftenest rule in matching.  
The laborer mates him with his like; the trader 
A trader’s daughter weds; wealth marries wealth; 
The courtier seeks his bride among the great.1 
 
Married couples constitute the wealthiest family structure in the United 
States, holding far more wealth than any other family type.2 In fact, 
households in the top 1% of the wealth distribution are most likely to be 
comprised of married couples.3 To illustrate, only 3% of the world’s 
billionaires, as featured in the Forbes list in 2013, were unmarried.4 The 
link between wealth and marital status is not limited to the top 1%. The 
next 9% of households by wealth are also composed primarily of married 
                                                     
1. GEORGE H. CALVERT, COMEDIES 85 (1856).  
2. See infra Part II (presenting and analyzing data about family status and wealth accumulation).  
3. THOMAS J. STANLEY, THE MILLIONAIRE MIND 23 (2001) (“[A] large majority . . . of 
millionaires are married. Only 2 percent have never been married, and about 2 percent are currently 
divorced or separated. The rest are widowed.”); Lisa A. Keister, The One Percent, 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 
347, 356 (2014).  
4. Edwin Durgy, The World’s 12 Most Eligible Billionaire Bachelors, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2013), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwindurgy/2013/03/06/the-worlds-12-most-eligible-billionaire-
bachelors/#5456e2d130de [https://perma.cc/6NS6-NS5Y]. The Forbes list includes the richest people 
in the world, while this Article focuses only on the United States. But the point is illustrative of the 
trend in the United States; and, in any event, the United States is the most represented country in the 
Forbes list.  
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couples.5 The representation of married couples in the top 10% of wealth 
holders is higher than it is in any other group along the descending line of 
net wealth.6 Further, even among the wealthiest, married couples are 
likely to hold significantly more wealth than their nonmarried 
counterparts.7 This Article calls the accumulation of wealth among 
married households in the top 10% (including the top 1%), in comparison 
with all households in the bottom 90%, “the marital wealth gap.” It then 
considers the gap’s causes and harms, and the possible solutions for 
narrowing this gap. 
What explains the success of married couples at the top of the wealth 
distribution—compared with other families—in creating and retaining 
wealth? Scholars who have examined the connection between wealth and 
family structure have advanced two primary explanations: that marriage, 
as a legal and societal framework, is the cause of this advantage;8 and that 
economies of scale explain the relative success of married couples in 
amassing wealth.9 
But these accounts serve only as partial explanations. Supplementing 
the existing interpretations, this Article reveals various legal mechanisms 
that privilege married couples in the creation and retention of wealth. Put 
differently, it exposes the various state policies that reinforce and amplify 
the preexisting power and wealth inequalities that serve as the foundation 
of the marital wealth gap. It shows that the law plays a crucial role in 
bestowing advantages that increase the accumulation and retention of 
wealth of married couples who are already well-off. To unveil aspects of 
the law’s role, this Article creates a taxonomy of the primary mechanisms 
by which marital status helps wealthy married couples to maximize their 
wealth holding.10 It argues, then, that marriage is a tool for the 
concentration of wealth, mainly benefiting those who already have 
                                                     
5. See infra Part II (providing data about wealth holding and family structure). 
6. See infra Part II.  
7. See infra Part II.  
8. These scholars contend that married couples do better in terms of wealth holding because the 
marital framework encourages the kind of responsible behavior that results in wealth accumulation. 
See infra section III.A. This strand of scholarship, for the most part, has not aimed to think about 
wealth inequality but only to advance the theory that marriage should be promoted as a solution to 
poverty.  
9. See, e.g., Allison Linn, Why Married People Tend to Be Wealthier: It’s Complicated, TODAY 
(Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.today.com/money/why-married-people-tend-be-wealthier-its-comp 
licated-1C8364877 [https://perma.cc/A9TL-LCVU] (“Once they are married, the couples also are 
able to take advantage of economies of scale. . . . [T]hose advantages go beyond just sharing 
expenses. People who are married also are able to divide up responsibilities in financially beneficial 
ways.”). 
10. See infra section III.C.  
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significant amounts of wealth. The marital wealth gap is a piece of the 
larger puzzle of wealth inequality. 
Exploring the connection between family structure and wealth 
inequality—to be distinguished from income inequality11—is essential at 
a time when the wealth gap in the United States is expanding 
dramatically.12 Yet, the link between laws pertaining to regulation of the 
household and wealth inequality remains underexplored and 
undertheorized. Thus, one of this Article’s principal interventions is to 
invite a shift in family law from a discourse focused more narrowly on 
income inequality to one that also addresses the wealth gap.13 
The analysis is interdisciplinary. That is, by “family law,” this Article 
means more than the set of rules pertaining to marriage and divorce. 
Instead, it embraces a broader definition—one that includes explicit and 
implicit laws and norms that govern and impact the economics of the 
household. In so doing, this Article joins a newer strand of scholarship 
that views families as institutions affected by laws, norms, and economic 
structures,14 and the field of family law as encompassing the universe of 
laws, structures, norms, and institutions that affect the economics of the 
household.15 Thus, the family law that this Article explores includes the 
                                                     
11. See infra Part I (discussing the differences between wealth and income and arguing that because 
wealth inequality is more enduring and unbalanced family law should pay attention to it, too).  
12. Wealth inequality has become an immense problem in the United States: since the 1960s, 
families at the tenth percentile of wealth holding have gone from holding no wealth to owing about 
$1,000 in debt; meanwhile, the wealth of families in the ninetieth percentile has increased five-fold. 
Nine Charts About Wealth Inequality in America (Updated), URB. INST. (Oct. 5, 2017), 
http://apps.urban.org/features/wealth-inequality-charts/ [https://perma.cc/39ZH-7KAP]; see infra 
Part I (discussing wealth inequality in the United States).  
13. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING 
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 50, 199 (2014) [hereinafter CARBONE & CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS] 
(arguing that falling marriage rates are influenced by economic inequality); June Carbone & Naomi 
Cahn, Is Marriage for Rich Men?, 13 NEV. L.J. 386, 403–06 (2013) (connecting economic inequality 
to family instability and the prospects of marriage); Nancy Leong, Is Marriage for Rich People? A 
Book Review of Ralph Richard Banks’s Is Marriage for White People?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1325, 1336 
(2012) (“Of course, the factors explaining the trend toward income inequality are many and complex, 
but it is clear that marriage insularity with respect to class exacerbates rather than alleviates the 
problem.”); infra section III.A (discussing the existing scholarly approaches to the connection 
between wealth holding and marital status).  
14. See, e.g., CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS xii (2014) (exploring how “structural family law”—from employment discrimination 
to zoning laws—impacts families’ lives); Maxine Eichner, The Family, in Context, 128 HARV. L. REV 
1980, 1981 (2015) (book review) (describing a new trend in family law scholarship “[f]ueled by the 
recognition that families are social institutions profoundly affected by their social and economic 
contexts”).  
15. This Article uses the term “family law” broadly to treat what Janet Halley and Kerry Rittich 
call “Family Law 1, 2, 3, and 4”—laws and norms, outside the traditional realm of family law, that 
explicitly or implicitly govern the laws of the household. See Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical 
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impact of rules and norms of various fields on households and 
relationships. For example, it considers tax law, trusts and estates, and 
norms of privatizations of support, as well as physical and economic 
structures that affect the ways individuals sort their potential intimate 
partners. 
An interdisciplinary examination of the family wealth gap 
demonstrates that marriage is not an effective redistributive tool for 
wealth concentrated at the top.16 Focusing on wealth at the apex of wealth 
ownership reveals that marriage is a means for concentration of wealth, 
assisting those who are already well-off in consolidating and maximizing 
their wealth holding. The wealth-related benefits that are attendant to 
marriage are helpful only to those who already own significant assets; 
they do not assist married couples who are not at the top of the wealth 
distribution. Therefore, attaching wealth benefits to marriage cannot be 
justified as part of a policy of incentivizing non-affluent married couples 
to get married. 
Are policies that help wealthy married couples to accumulate wealth 
justified? The theory is that marriage has the potential to reduce wealth 
inequalities by fragmenting inheritance over generations, if people from 
different wealth-holding quantiles marry in significant numbers.17 But, as 
sociological data unequivocally demonstrate, the trend in the United 
States is toward positive assortative mating; that is, people typically marry 
partners with socioeconomic and educational backgrounds similar to their 
                                                     
Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law 
Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 761 (2010). This approach is grounded in dismantling the 
exceptionalism of family law. It opposes the views that treat family as the opposite of the market (i.e., 
those views that treat the family as based on notions of altruism and status and not on selfishness and 
contracts—the latter being traditionally construed as describing the market).  
16. Only a few commentators expressly discuss—typically on a theoretical level—the idea of 
marriage as a redistributive tool. The more traditional and common account is that marriage is a tool 
to fight poverty. See, e.g., ISABEL V. SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND 
PARENTHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE 5–12 (2014); W. Bradford Wilcox & Robert I. Lerman, For 
Richer, for Poorer: How Family Structures Economic Success in America, AM. ENTER. INST. (Oct. 
28, 2014), http://www.aei.org/publication/for-richer-for-poorer-how-family-structures-economic-
success-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/Q6VB-C8YX]; Ari Fleischer, How to Fight Income Inequality: 
Get Married, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270 
2304325004579296752404877612 [https://perma.cc/4LCR-8TC9] (“If President Obama wants to 
reduce income inequality, he should focus less on redistributing income and more on fighting a major 
cause of modern poverty: the breakdown of the family.”). The question of marriage as a policy tool 
to combat poverty is not what this Article explores. The Article does tackle the question of marriage’s 
potential role in fighting (and contributing to) wealth concentration, but it concludes that the state 
should not rely on marriage to do the job of combating the marital wealth gap. See infra sections 
III.D.2 and IV.B.   
17. See infra section IV.B (discussing the role of marriage in breaking up family fortunes).  
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own.18 Thus, in the United States, quite frequently wealth marries 
wealth.19 As this marriage pattern concentrates wealth, assortative mating 
further explains how marriage profits the more affluent by increasing the 
wealth owned via marriage. 
How should the state respond to the role marriage serves in 
concentrating wealth? This Article proposes a fundamental shift in state 
and federal policies concerning wealth benefits and marital status, 
enabling the state to reduce marriage’s role as a wealth aggregator. It 
argues that if marriage is already the preserve of the well-off, then the 
state should decouple wealth benefits from marriage. This approach is 
grounded in adoption of “transformative” remedies, which are designed 
to recognize diverse family types (not just marital households) while also 
combating the structures that enable wealth concentration among affluent 
married couples.20 This framework would help dismantle the architecture 
that supports the marital wealth gap. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the growth of wealth 
inequality in the United States and identifies its harms. It also suggests 
that family law scholarship’s focus on wealth distribution at the time of 
divorce should expand to evaluating the role of marriage in economic 
inequality in society generally. Part II propounds data on the correlation 
between family structure and wealth ownership to demonstrate the marital 
wealth gap. Part III critiques the argument that marital behavior, alone or 
even primarily, explains the marital wealth gap and shows that various 
other factors, including intergenerational transfers, are significant in 
producing wealth inequality. Section III.C then identifies and produces a 
taxonomy of the ways the law contributes to wealth concentration within 
married households at the top of the wealth distribution. Section III.D 
asserts that class-based marriage patterns further explain the marital 
wealth gap and contribute to wealth inequality. This section contends that 
individuals’ decisions to marry someone with similar socioeconomic 
backgrounds is frequently informed by our society’s increased 
socioeconomic segregation. Part IV advocates a pioneering shift in the 
way the state treats wealth and family status. It advances a theory 
grounded in transformative “recognition and redistribution” that 
decentralizes marriage’s monopoly on wealth-related benefits. It also 
                                                     
18. See infra section III.D.1 (providing and analyzing data about patterns of assortative mating).  
19. See infra section III.D.1.  
20. I build on the work of Nancy Fraser, who distinguishes between “recognition” and 
“redistribution” claims and between “affirmative” and “transformative” remedies. See Nancy Fraser, 
From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-Socialist” Age, 212 NEW LEFT 
REV. 68, 70–74 (1995). 
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argues that such strategies should simultaneously aim to reduce wealth 
concentration among the richest households. 
I. INEQUALITY: A LOOK AT WEALTH VS. INCOME 
In recent years, wealth inequality in the United States has been 
impelled to the center of scholarly and public debate.21 At the heart of this 
discussion is the fact that, compared with analogous nations, the United 
States exhibits extreme wealth inequality,22 which has grown 
tremendously since the late 1970s.23 
To understand the discussion, one first needs to distinguish between 
wealth and income. “Wealth” refers to the market value of all the assets 
owned by households minus their liabilities (debt).24 “Income,” on the 
other hand, is the “flow of financial resources”25 and is derived mainly 
from wages, interest or investment in capital, or government transfer 
payments.26 The two, of course, are connected—income affords the 
buying of capital, and capital produces income—but they are not the 
same.27 People generally do not use their wealth for everyday living 
expenses (though they may use the income that capital yields for that 
                                                     
21. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014); David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014); Edward 
J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously (USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 16–10, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2738848 [https://perma.cc/8WU8-X5BP]. 
Senator Bernie Sanders called attention to wealth inequality when he stated that “since the mid-1980s 
there has been an enormous transfer of wealth from the middle class and the poor to the wealthiest 
people in this country. That is the Robin Hood principle in reverse.” Income and Wealth Inequality, 
BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com/issues/income-and-wealth-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/Q4DP-
H8DG]. 
22. See, e.g., MARIKO LIN CHANG, SHORTCHANGED: WHY WOMEN HAVE LESS WEALTH AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 6 (2010). 
23. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: 
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q. J. ECON. 519, 523 (2016).  
24. Id. at 525. Assets include all the nonfinancial and financial resources that provide economic 
benefits to their owners, such as property, cars, savings, retirement accounts, bonds, and stocks. Id.; 
see also LARS OSBERG, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1984) (wealth is “the total 
extent, at a point in time, of an individual’s access to resources”). 
25. LISA A. KEISTER, WEALTH IN AMERICA: TRENDS IN WEALTH INEQUALITY 6 (2000) (emphasis 
in original).  
26. OSBERG, supra note 24, at 10; see also McCaffery, supra note 21, at 7–8.  
27. Further, income inequality and wealth inequality are related; due to large gaps in salaries, the 
top earners can buy more capital and still keep their existing capital. At the same time, some people 
who own significant wealth lack high income. For instance, retired persons often have homes or 
retirement plans, but their income is quite limited. See CHANG, supra note 22, at 5. 
04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  4:13 PM 
8 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1 
 
purpose), but they do use income for necessities and in the course of their 
everyday lives.28 
Wealth is a better indicator of financial status than income  because it 
measures the total economic resources that are available to its holder.29 
Income alone is not an accurate indicator of wealth holdings for the reason 
that a relatively weak correlation exists between income level and wealth 
ownership.30 Estimates from survey data during the 1980s suggested that 
the correlation between income and wealth was about 0.50; after 
removing income that derives from assets, the correlation fell to 0.26.31 
As the economic gap in the United States widens, however, the correlation 
between income and wealth is getting stronger.32 
The case of women who have never married, and who work full time, 
demonstrates how income is an insufficient indicator of economic status. 
According to the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, the median income 
of never-married women was $34,518, while the median income of never-
married men working full time was $35,429, which means that women 
earned 97% as much income as their male counterparts.33 Thus, relying 
on income alone, it seems like women almost closed the economic gap 
between men and women. However, never-married women working full 
time held about one-third of the wealth of never-married men working full 
time. Specifically, women in this group only had a median net worth of 
$6,750, while their male counterparts had a median net worth of 
$18,500.34 If income were our only lens, we would incorrectly assume that 
the financial situation of never-married women was quite similar to that 
of their male counterparts.35 
                                                     
28. KEISTER, supra note 25, at 6. 
29. See CHANG, supra note 22, at 4. 
30. Lisa A. Keister & Stephanie Moller, Wealth Inequality in the United States, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 
63, 65 (2000).  
31. Id. at 65.  
32. RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IS 
LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 25 
(2017) (“In fact, the link between income and wealth is strengthening over time.”).  
33. MARIKO CHANG, ASSET FUNDERS NETWORK, WOMEN AND WEALTH: INSIGHTS FOR 
GRANTMAKERS 9 (2015), http://www.mariko-chang.com/AFN_Women_and_Wealth_Brief_2015. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/6PED-Q5XT]. 
34. Id.  
35. For scholarly discussion of the “gender wealth gap,” its causes, and possible policies for 
remedy, see WOMEN AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (Carmen Diana Deere & Cheryl R. Doss 
eds., 2007); CHANG, supra note 22; Alyssa Schneebaum et al., The Gender Wealth Gap Across 
European Countries, REV. INCOME WEALTH (2017); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum 
Taxation and the Squeezed Out Mom, 105 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1327–28 (2017) (asserting that mothers 
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Additionally, it is important to consider wealth because wealth has 
some benefits that income does not. Wealth can be transferred to the next 
generation or sold to others (unlike employment).36 It can also generate 
supplemental income, be used as collateral for loans with better tax 
conditions, serve as a cushion in times of emergency and unemployment, 
and provide flexibility in working patterns (one can generally rely more 
on the income from assets than from labor earnings). In short, wealth 
produces more wealth,37 especially because income from capital is taxed 
more favorably than income from labor.38 
Finally, discussing wealth is important because, in the words of Lisa A. 
Keister, “while disparities in income and educational attainment are 
extreme, disparities in the ownership of wealth are likely worse and 
apparently more enduring across generations.”39 Likewise, a recent 
OECD report that examined wealth inequality among eighteen countries 
concluded that “household wealth is much more concentrated than 
household income.”40 
Indeed, the wealth gap in the United States has reached ominous 
dimensions. The worrisome aspect of the gap, and the one that public 
debate is most focused on, is the concentration of wealth among the top 
1% of wealth holders.41 In 2016, the top 1% owned 38.6% of the wealth 
in the United States, the highest proportion in almost a century.42 Further, 
                                                     
who try to reenter workforce after maternity leave see reductions in retirement savings and other 
benefits). 
36. CHANG, supra note 22, at 4.  
37. See OSBERG, supra note 24, at 198; Mariko Lin Chang, Women & Wealth, in WEALTH 
ACCUMULATION AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN THE UNITED STATES 112, 112 (Jessica Gordon 
Nembhard & Ngina Chiteji eds., 2006); Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and 
the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 458 (2010).  
38. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012) (establishing preferential tax rates applicable to capital gain 
income). 
39. KEISTER supra note 25, at 3–4; see also Michael Hiltzik, U.S. Income Is Bad, but Wealth 
Inequality Is a Bigger Problem, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://www.latimes.com/bus 
iness/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-us-income-inequality-is-bad-20141024-column.html [https://perma.cc/6B4H-
8FP8]; Christopher Ingraham, If You Thought Income Inequality Was Bad, Get a Load of Wealth 
Inequality, WASH. POST (May 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/ 
21/the-top-10-of-americans-own-76-of-the-stuff-and-its-dragging-our-economy-down 
[https://perma.cc/23DE-56WG].  
40. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., IN IT TOGETHER: WHY LESS INEQUALITY BENEFITS 
ALL 274 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264235120-en [https://perma.cc/TBR3-C7VF]; see 
also PIKETTY, supra note 21, at 244 (“The distribution of capital ownership (and of income from 
capital) is always more concentrated than the distribution of income from labor.”). 
41. See, e.g., REEVES, supra note 32, at 22 (stating that the debate about the top 1% is “especially 
salient” recently). 
42. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 
2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL. 3, 10–11 (2017), 
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according to one estimate, in two to three more decades the top 1% will 
eventually hold roughly 50% of the wealth in the United States.43 The 
amassment of wealth becomes even more extreme in regard to the top 
one-tenth of 1% of Americans. This fraction owns almost as much wealth 
as the bottom 90%.44 The group is composed of approximately 160,000 
families; in 2012, their net assets on average per family were estimated at 
$20 million or more.45 
Contrary to popular belief, the parameters of the wealth inequality 
problem extend beyond wealth concentration among the top 1%. 
Increasingly, the top 10% of wealth holders, as well, contribute to the 
growing wealth inequality in the United States.46 In 2013, the 
Congressional Budget Office found that households in the ninetieth 
percentile of wealth held an average of $942,000 in wealth.47 Households 
in the ninety-fifth percentile held an average of $1,872,000.48 The wealth 
                                                     
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KLN-Y959]; Wealth 
Inequality in the United States, INEQUALITY.ORG, https://inequality.org/facts/wealth-inequality/ 
[https://perma.cc/UJ8Z-Q4RC] (“Over the past century, the share of America’s wealth held by the 
nation’s wealthiest has changed markedly. That share peaked in the late 1920s, right before the Great 
Depression, then fell by more than half over the next three decades. But the equalizing trends of the 
mid 20th century have now been almost completely undone.”). Another recent article by Edward N. 
Wolff documented that in 2016 the top 1% held 39.6% of the country’s wealth. Edward N. Wolff, 
Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered? 
44 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24085, 2017), http://papers.nber.org/tmp/ 
7707-w24085.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CD8-782N].  
43. Baris Kaymak & Marcus Poschke, The Evolution of Wealth Inequality Over Half a Century: 
The Role of Taxes, Transfers, and Technology, 77 J. MONETARY ECON. 1, 19 (2016). 
44. McCaffery, supra note 21, at 1.  
45. Saez & Zucman, supra note 23, at 521.  
46. Different commentators suggest different ways to characterize the group that generates 
economic inequality. Richard Reeves, for instance, insists that we should think in terms of the “upper 
middle class,” which comprises the top 20% of income earners in the United States and pulls away 
from the rest of society. Others suggest that we should look at the top 5% of wealth holders or focus 
only on the top 1%. See REEVES, supra note 32, at 19–20 (surveying a few of the main approaches to 
characterize the class divide). My focus on those who fall within the top 10% of wealth distribution 
is due to the fact that this group holds disproportional wealth compared with other groups. “In 2013, 
families in the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution held 76 percent of all family wealth” while 
“families in the 51st to the 90th percentiles held 23 percent.” CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN 
FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, 1 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-
2015-2016/reports/51846-familywealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD5B-FS2C]. Thus, it seems justified 
to hold the line at 10%.  
47. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, SUPPLEMENTAL DATA & 
DATA UNDERLYING THE EXHIBITS AND FIGURE (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51846-supplementaldata.xlsx [https://perma.cc/25EP-3AN2] 
(using data primarily from the Survey of Consumer Finances).  
48. Id.  
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owned by the top 10% of households increased from 67% in 1983 to 75% 
in 2013.49 
The amassment of wealth at the top correlates with erosion of wealth 
in the middle class and the groups below.50 Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel 
Zucman define the “middle class” as families in the top 50–90% of wealth 
holders; notably, the bottom 50% own close to zero net wealth.51 While 
middle-class Americans held 35% of the wealth in the United States in the 
mid-1980s, they held only 23% in 2012.52 Quite astonishingly, the middle 
class presently possesses more or less the same proportion of wealth that 
it held seven decades ago.53 In 2013, households at the twenty-fifth 
percentile or below had an average of $13,000 in debt.54 The bottom line 
is that the top 1%, together with the next 9%, holds around three-quarters 
of the wealth in the United States, leaving around 25% of net worth with 
the remaining households.55 
The uneven concentration at the top end of wealth distribution has a 
profoundly adverse effect on society. Much ink has been spilled over the 
question of whether economic inequality is, in and of itself, unjust.56 That 
question is beyond the scope of this Article. Its potential moral problems 
aside, wealth inequality has palpably injurious effects to society and to 
individuals. Wealth inequality makes communities more polarized and 
segregated, geographically and culturally.57 This is not a problem 
implicating solely the uber-rich but one that involves affluent families in 
general. The increasing class-segregation of neighborhoods provides 
these families more access to social capital, schools, and education.58 This 
                                                     
49. See Kaymak & Poschke, supra note 43, at 1.  
50. Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality, in PATHWAYS: STATE OF THE UNION—THE POVERTY AND 
INEQUALITY REPORT 2016, 39, 42 (2016), http://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways-
SOTU-2016-Wealth-Inequality-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD9C-GLJ6]. 
51. Saez & Zucman, supra note 23, at 554–55.  
52. Id. at 523. 
53. Id. at 555. 
54. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 46, at 1. 
55. Keister, The One Percent, supra note 3, at 353.  
56. See OSBERG, supra note 24, at 3 (1984) (explaining that “[m]ost people’s interest in the extent 
and causes of inequality stems, however, from the value which they place in ‘equality’”); Ann E. 
Cudd, Economic Inequality and Global Justice, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 159, 160–61 (Helen M. Stacy & Win Chiat Lee eds., 2013) (arguing that “[e]conomic 
inequality is not necessarily unjust” but that “great inequalities in wealth can define power relations 
in a society that are problematic for justice”).  
57. CHUCK COLLINS, 99 TO 1: HOW WEALTH INEQUALITY IS WRECKING THE WORLD AND WHAT 
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 61–62 (2012).  
58. See REEVES, supra note 32, at 31 (“The clustering of upper middle-class families into certain 
neighborhoods deepens the class divide.”).  
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geographical segregation can lead to less investment in public services, as 
the rich create and use a separate system of services.59 
Additional adverse effects of wealth inequality are well documented. 
Wealth inequality can aggregate political power in the hands of a few, 
thus distorting the preference of the majority by influencing elections and 
other political processes.60 This, in turn, can result in less participation and 
representation of others in the political system. Again, while public 
discussions often attribute this harm to the top 1%, it is also true that those 
who belong to the top 10% have significant political power that helps 
them set policies that benefit them the most.61 Moreover, wide gaps in 
wealth concentration might also limit economic growth, as the less-
wealthy live mainly from their incomes and are unable to produce more 
wealth. Wealth inequality thus contributes to increased debt and less 
economic activity and spending.62 At the same time, wealth concentration 
generates income from capital to the wealthiest and, thus, increases 
income inequality.63 
There are some indications that extreme financial inequalities also lead 
to more crime because people at the “losing end” of such inequalities may 
not have other ways to support themselves except through criminal acts, 
or may resort to crime because they feel they have been treated unfairly.64 
Finally, wide gaps in wealth holding contradict the idea of a society 
grounded in meritocracy—where people advance based on individual 
merit and not by the situation they were born into—because 
overconcentration makes social mobility and equal opportunity more 
confined.65 The privilege that wealth provides is relevant, in varying 
                                                     
59. COLLINS, supra note 57, at 63–65.  
60. See, e.g., REEVES, supra note 32, at 8 (“An individual billionaire can have a disproportionate 
influence on an individual politician . . . .”); Cudd, supra note 56, at 165 (“There is another source of 
unfairness leading to economic inequality, and that is inequality that is perpetuated or magnified by 
the rich who are able to rig the laws that determine what count as property rights and legitimate 
transactions in their favor.”). 
61. Cf. REEVES, supra note 32, at 8 (“But the upper middle class has outsized political power, 
too.”).  
62. COLLINS, supra note 57, at 65–67.  
63. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 40, at 36.  
64. STEVEN PRESSMAN, UNDERSTANDING PIKETTY’S CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 36–
37 (2016).  
65. Id. at 62–63; JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 106–46 
(1983) (discussing equal opportunity from a political theory point of view); HEATHER BETH JOHNSON, 
THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE POWER OF WEALTH 9–10 (2006) (discussing the dominance of 
meritocracy in U.S. culture and politics); Benjamin Means, Wealth Inequality and Family Businesses, 
65 EMORY L.J. 937, 943 (2016) (“Wealth inequality is disturbing, not only because of its magnitude 
but also because it often reflects family background more than individual merit.”). 
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degrees, to all those from advantaged wealthy backgrounds because even 
a small inheritance can make a large difference in life chances and in 
opportunities to accrue more wealth.66 
Although this Article focuses on the concentration of wealth at the top 
and does not deal with the poverty side of wealth inequality, the impact 
of the wealth gap on the poor must be recognized. The lack of wealth for 
most of the population raises a host of societal and moral problems related 
to poverty.67 The impact of wealth inequality on the poor and working 
class is particularly pertinent in the United States due to the relatively thin 
safety net the state provides.68 Savings are especially important in periods 
of unemployment, retirement, medical emergencies, and care for children. 
But the high cost of caregiving and healthcare—given the absence of 
inexpensive universal healthcare, subsidized paternity leave, or state-
supported childcare—makes wealth more important in the United States 
than in other countries where the state provides a more generous safety 
net.69 Savings are also essential in the United States due to the rising costs 
of higher education.70 
Wealth inequality also correlates with racial inequality.71 Based on the 
2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, a Pew research report found that, in 
2013, the median wealth of a white family was $141,900, while for 
African American households it was $11,000, and for Hispanic 
                                                     
66. See Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, Inheritance and Stratification, in INHERITANCE 
AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 193, 194 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998) (“This 
applies not just to the top 1 percent . . . but in varying degrees to all those from relatively privileged 
backgrounds.”).  
67. See, e.g., Cudd, supra note 56, at 160 (discussing the connections between poverty and 
economic inequality).  
68. See Karen Jusko, Safety Net, in PATHWAYS: STATE OF THE UNION—THE POVERTY AND 
INEQUALITY REPORT 2016, 25, 25–31 (2016) (“The overall amount of poverty relief [in the U.S.] is 
the lowest among the 13 countries in our analysis; the baseline level of support is the fourth lowest 
among our countries; and the rate of relief falloff is just slightly above the median level.”).  
69. Melissa Murray, Black Marriage, White People, Red Herrings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 977, 996 
(2013) (“The European safety nets help contextualize the thin level of public support for American 
families.”).  
70. See, e.g., Grey Gordon & Aaron Hedlund, Accounting for the Rise in College Tuition (Ctr. for 
Applied Econ. and Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2013-013, 2015), http://www.iub. 
edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/2015/CAEPR2015-015.pdf [https://perma.cc/A95B-27HG] (“From 1987 to 
2010, sticker price tuition and fees [for college] ballooned from $6,600 to $14,500 in 2010 dollars. 
After subtracting institutional aid, net tuition and fees still grew by 78%, from $5,790 to $10,290.”).  
71. It is difficult to generalize about the wealth-holding status of Asian Americans because of the 
wide disparities between ethnic groups within that community. Data are quite limited about intragroup 
inequality. See Paul Ong & R. Varisa Patraporn, Asian Americans and Wealth, in WEALTH 
ACCUMULATION AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 37, at 173, 174–
76. 
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households, $13,700.72 The Census Bureau reported that African 
American households’ overall median net worth decreased by $3,746 
between 2000 and 2011.73 Similarly, “[t]he overall median net worth of 
Hispanic[] [households] decreased by $5,576 . . . between 2000 and 
2011.”74 Because primary data include only a small representation of 
Native Americans, information about wealth holding for this group is 
quite limited.75 However, the data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth of 1979 (NLSY) show that Native Americans lag significantly 
behind all other groups in wealth holding.76 
Although the subject of wealth inequality has recently become 
commonplace in academic literature and popular debate,77 scholarship in 
the area of domestic relations has not probed the connection between laws 
of adult relationships and the concentration of wealth among the richest 
families. In the past two decades, scholars often critiqued the separation 
between welfare law and family law, maintaining that family law is more 
preoccupied with middle-class families and neglects laws pertaining to 
low-income families.78 Nevertheless, the current era of family law 
scholarship has produced tremendously important and thoughtful work on 
the complex modes in which family law interacts with economic 
inequality.79 Such research primarily examines the impact of economic 
structures on the family unit and the connections between family law and 
                                                     
72. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines 
Since End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/ 
fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/2WGL-VZJ3].  
Indeed, part of the platform of Black Lives Matter includes a call for fairer taxation of wealth. See 
ANJA RUDDIGER, CATHY ALBISA, & KARL KUMODZI, A PROGRESSIVE RESTRUCTURING OF ALL TAX 
CODES AT THE LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LEVELS TO ENSURE A RADICAL AND SUSTAINABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/blm.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQM3-
2FJM]. 
73. MARINA VORNOVITSKY, ALFRED GOTTSCHALCK, & ADAM SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN THE U.S.: 2000 TO 2011, at 4 (2011), https:// 
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2011/demo/wealth-distribution-2000-
to-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK37-8G27]. 
74. Id.  
75. Jay L. Zagorsky, Native Americans’ Wealth, in WEALTH ACCUMULATION AND COMMUNITIES 
OF COLOR IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 37, at 133, 134–35.  
76. For instance, 25% of Native Americans in 2000 had zero wealth holding or had debt, compared 
with 10% of their counterparts with such level of debt (comparison is between baby boomers in the 
year 2000). Id. at 140.  
77. See, e.g., Zucman, supra note 50, at 39 (“With the takeoff in income inequality by now well-
known, attention has shifted of late to trends in wealth inequality.”).  
78. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 892 (2004) 
(“The family law governing the poor is also excluded from the family law canon.”).  
79. See, e.g., CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 13.  
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poverty.80 However, this strand of work does not investigate how family 
law supports affluent families in ways that result in structural economic 
inequalities. Nor does it explore the means by which the family, as an 
economic unit, generates economic inequality. What family law has not 
explored is, then, left to tax law scholarship. 
The main discussion on the intersection of wealth and family law has 
focused on the “gender wealth gap”—the ways that rules about division 
of property after breakup operate to the detriment of women as the main 
caregivers in the family.81 However, outside the context of divorce, 
scholars have rarely analyzed how certain laws affecting the family as an 
economic unit interconnect with the wealth gap. One notable exception is 
Benjamin Means’s recent work on the relationship between family 
businesses and wealth inequality.82 Some of this lacuna in the family law 
literature has been occupied by critical tax scholarship documenting how 
the tax code unfavorably treats some types of families, especially those 
with dual equal earners, racial minorities, and low-income 
breadwinners.83 This strand of scholarship examines the issue through the 
lens of taxation but does not directly address other aspects that affect the 
wealth accumulation of households outside questions relating to tax. The 
gap that this Article thus attempts to fill concerns the larger project of 
economic inequality and the way in which family status—and marriage in 
particular—preserves wealth, and the problems the marital wealth gap 
creates. 
                                                     
80. See, e.g., id. at 406 (“While high-status men will still marry more than low-status men, the high-
status men are less likely to be married in cities with higher-income inequality than comparable men 
elsewhere.”).  
81. See, e.g., Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 317, 340, 
345–47 (2016); Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1271–72 (2015) 
(arguing that current rules pertaining to division of property upon divorce—and, particularly, division 
of professional assets—do not reflect the marital bargain, and they primarily harm the main caregiver 
in the relationship).  
82. Means, supra note 65, at 940 (arguing that, “[o]n the one hand, family businesses can entrench 
existing disparities in wealth and opportunity. . . . On the other hand, family businesses can be a 
powerful antidote to inequality”).  
83. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, 65 ALA. L. REV. 187, 
231 (2013) (“The gender and race dimensions of wealth inequality in the United States are 
indisputable and deeply troubling. Women of all races are less wealthy than men, and the wealth 
disparity is particularly acute for single women of color.”); Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of 
Windsor: The Taxation of Women in Same-Sex Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 328 (2016) 
(arguing “that women in same-sex marriages will be less likely than other married people to enjoy 
significant marriage tax benefits, and more likely to incur substantial marriage tax burdens”); Edward 
J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 
UCLA L. REV. 983, 987 (1993); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family: 
Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559, 560–63 (2016); Nancy C. 
Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1573 (1996).  
04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  4:13 PM 
16 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1 
 
To summarize, wealth is an important indicator of one’s economic 
position. Wealth inequality in the United States is growing rapidly and 
consistently, but the connections between wealth inequality and family 
status are mostly underexplored. The next Part reviews the empirical data 
about family status and wealth holding. 
II. THE MARITAL WEALTH GAP 
The marital wealth gap is captured by and illustrated through four sets 
of data. First, the Article examines the median wealth of married 
households compared with other households. Second, looking beyond the 
median, it reviews the connection between wealth holding and families at 
the apex of wealth ownership. Accordingly, the Article finds that 
households at the top 10% of wealth ownership are more likely to be 
married than any other group. Third, some data support the claim that even 
among the wealthiest taxpayers, married couples hold, on average, 
significantly more wealth than single individuals and unmarried couples. 
Fourth, the portfolio of investments held by married couples in general is 
more diversified than other families’. 
Wealth ownership and family structure are highly correlated.84 Data 
consistently show a ranking wherein married families own the most, 
followed by widowed, divorced, and, last, never-married individuals.85 Of 
course, marriage merges the assets of couples (in terms of measuring their 
net wealth), so they have more wealth than a single individual. 
                                                     
84. Keister & Moller, supra note 30, at 73.  
85. See, e.g., LISA A. KEISTER, GETTING RICH: AMERICA’S NEW RICH AND HOW THEY GOT THAT 
WAY 210–11, tbl.8.1 (2005) (“Marriage behavior affects wealth in important ways that are well 
documented but seldom discussed in detail. This is unfortunate because there are relationships 
between marriage, divorce, widowhood, and wealth that are fundamental to understand the 
accumulation of wealth of assets and wealth mobility.”); cf. Keister & Moller, supra note 30, at 73 
(noting that “[f]amily structure also plays an important role in creating and maintaining differences 
in wealth ownership” and that “there is evidence that marriage and widowhood increase wealth 
ownership, while increased family size and family dissolution through divorce or separation have the 
opposite effect” (citation omitted)). The data this Part provides concern households with opposite-sex 
couples because, for the most part, the data are from years in which same-sex couples were not able 
to get married in the United States. Generally, the data about wealth holding by married and unmarried 
same-sex couples are nascent at this point. However, some indications are that married same-sex 
couples lag behind their opposite-sex counterparts in terms of wealth ownership. For example, 
according to data from the United States Census Bureau from 2014, 66.9% of married, same-sex-
couple households owned homes, compared with 79.1% of their opposite-sex counterparts. Further, 
68.3% of male-male married couples owned homes, compared with 65.5% of female-female married 
couples. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF OPPOSITE-SEX AND SAME-
SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS: ACS 2014 tbl.1 (2014).  
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Nonetheless, as the data show, the wealth of married couples is often 
significantly greater than just double that of two single individuals.86 
Based on the NLSY 1979, noted above, which examines wealth 
ownership of adults born between 1957 and 1964,87 Alexis Yamokoski 
and Lisa Keister estimated that, in 2000, married adults had a median net 
worth of nearly $100,000, about seven and a half times the median net 
worth for all single adults reported on in these data.88 
After married couples, the wealthiest families are those in which one 
spouse has predeceased the other. Here, the wealth gap between men 
(widowers) and women (widows) is quite significant. For widowers, the 
median wealth was $125,000, while, for widows, it was $73,400—
meaning that widows held only 59% of the wealth that widowers held.89 
The 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances data demonstrate an even 
wider gap between divorced and married households. Households with 
married couples (of all ages) owned a median wealth of $148,700, while 
divorced men owned a median wealth of $44,000, and divorced women, 
$19,380.90 Hence, the combined median wealth of the two households of 
divorced couples is approximately $64,000, which means that the median 
wealth of a divorced household is around 43% that of a married 
household. 
Most relevant to this Article is the wealth gap between cohabiting 
(unmarried) couples and married couples. Based on data from multiple 
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Alicia Eads 
                                                     
86. F. Thomas Juster, James P. Smith & Frank Stafford, The Measurement and Structure of 
Household Wealth, 6 LAB. ECON. 253, 263–64 (1999) (“Most directly, marriage combines the 
separate assets of men and women into a single unit so that, on average, married households will have 
twice the wealth of single households. But differences by marriage are much greater than that with 
married couples typically having three and one-half times as much wealth as nonmarried 
households.”).  
87. The NLSY 1979 followed these adults annually from 1979 to 1994 and every other year since 
then. National Longitudinal Survey, BUREAU LAB. STATS., U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
https://www.bls.gov/nls/y79summary.htm [https://perma.cc/5VTZ-J4ZX] (last updated June 25, 
2003). It followed the same group of people to sketch their development through the years. Id. Starting 
from 1985, when the respondents reached the age of 20, the survey has also collected data about 
wealth holding. See Lisa A. Keister & E. Paige Borelli, Religion and Wealth Mobility: The Case of 
American Latinos, in RELIGION AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: RESEARCH AND THEORY ON 
RELIGION’S ROLE IN STRATIFICATION 119, 126 (Lisa A. Keister & Darren E. Sherkat eds., 2014). In 
terms of measuring wealth inequality, it is an ideal scale because it tracks the wealth holding of the 
same group of people at different points in time. See id.  
88. Alexis Yamokoski & Lisa A. Keister, The Wealth of Single Women: Marital Status and 
Parenthood in the Asset Accumulation of Young Baby Boomers in the United States, 12 FEMINIST 
ECON. 167, 178 (2006).  
89. Chang, supra note 37, at 115.  
90. Id. 
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and Laura Tach found that married couples own significantly more wealth 
than their unmarried counterparts.91 According to their data, which 
concerned couples’ wealth holding from 1996 to 2013, married couples 
held median net wealth of $142,000, while cohabiting couples held 
median net wealth of $24,800.92 
Not only are married households wealthier than all other household 
structures, the top 10% of wealth holders are married in greater 
proportions than other groups in the descending array of wealth holding. 
Based on the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, Keister concludes “that 
members of the one percent are disproportionately male, white, and 
married.”93 However, the data she relies on do not distinguish between 
unmarried and married couples but simply track households headed by 
couples versus single individuals. Hence, using this information, we can 
only learn that households at the top 1% tend to be partnered but not 
necessarily legally married. These same data (derived from the Survey of 
Consumer Finances) further demonstrate that, looking at the top 1%, more 
than 90% of households consist of couples; in the next 9%, almost 79% 
of households are couples; and, regarding the bottom 90%, only 55% of 
households consist of couples.94 This is already helpful, as it shows that 
single individuals have relatively less representation among the top 1% 
and the top 10% than other family types. While we do not know how many 
of these couples at the apex of wealth holding are married, data about 
income distribution teach that households at the top of the income 
distribution generally consist of married couples more than households in 
any of the other groups on this scale.95 Although wealth and income do 
not always correlate, data about income of married couples serve as one 
indication for the pronounced inclination toward marriage among top 
wealth holders.96 That the wealthiest households in the United States 
                                                     
91. Alicia Eads & Laura Tach, Wealth and Inequality in the Stability of Romantic Relationships, 2 
RSF: RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 197, 205–06 (2016).  
92. Id. at 206 (“The median married couple had about $68,000 in secured debt, $1,800 in unsecured 
debt, and $23,000 in liquid assets and $189,000 in illiquid assets. The median cohabiting couple, by 
contrast, had no secured debt, $700 in unsecured debt, $1,500 in liquid assets, and $24,000 in illiquid 
assets.”).  
93. Keister, The One Percent, supra note 3, at 356.  
94. Id. at 357 tbl.1.  
95. Cf. REEVES, supra note 32, at 28–29 (arguing that upper-middle-class individuals are more 
likely to get and stay married than other economic strata of the population).  
96. CHRISTINE PERCHESKI & CHRISTINA GIBSON-DAVIS, FAMILY STRUCTURE & WEALTH 
INEQUALITY AMONG FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN, 1989–2013, at 8 (2017), http://www.ecineq.org/ 
ecineq_nyc17/FILESx2017/CR2/p190.pdf [https://perma.cc/85AB-84NK] (“Income does not 
translate directly into wealth. Nevertheless, parents with higher incomes are likely to have more 
money that can be directed toward savings or asset accumulation.”).  
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primarily consist of married couples finds further support in data about 
wealth holding among parents, based on family structure. According to a 
recent study, in 2013, married parents in the top seventy-fifth percentile 
held a median net worth of $338,500, compared with $49,440 for 
cohabiting parents.97 Together, these studies offer a strong indication that 
the wealthiest households are more likely than any other group to be 
headed by married couples. 
Another aspect of the marital wealth gap is that, even among the richest 
families in the United States, married couples hold, on average, 
significantly more wealth than singles and unmarried couples. Recently 
released IRS data documenting charitable bequests made by decedents in 
2013 provide a solid sample that supports this argument. The population 
surveyed in these data, and that appear in Tables 1 and 2, consists 
of decedents making charitable bequests, not all decedents leaving 
estates. In 2013, this group included 2,634 decedents out of 10,568 estate 
tax returns from that year.98 This means that approximately one quarter of 
the estates in 2013 are represented in these data, a sizeable sample, and 
there is no reason to assume that the population that made charitable 
contributions is different in terms of wealth holding and family status 
from those populations who did not make such contributions. The data are 
categorized by the sex and marital status of the decedent.99 
  
                                                     
97. Id. at app. tbl.A2.  
98. SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics Filing Year Table 1, IRS (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-estate-tax-statistics-filing-year-table-1 [https://perma.cc/ 
26DK-PURF] (click link to table for 2013); SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Data, by Year of Death, IRS 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-estate-tax-statistics-year-of-death-table-3 
[https://perma.cc/KAL9-MRY6] (click link to table for 2013).  
99. See SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Data, by Year of Death, supra note 98 (click link to table for 
2013). 
In the original data, the amount is in thousands of dollars; I converted to billions and rounded up. 
The average does not appear in the original data and average can, obviously, be affected by any single 
estate that is too big or too small. I did not take into consideration the category of “other”—which 
refers to marital statuses “unknown,” “divorced,” or “legally separated”—because it included too 
many variations.  
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Table 1: 
Wealth of Estates Bequeathed by Male Decedents (2013) 
Decedent 
male  
Number of 
estates 
filed  
Total net 
worth for the 
category (in 
billions)  
Average 
wealth of an 
estate (in 
millions)  
Married  557 16.7  30  
Widowed  449  9.4  21  
Single  209  2.4  11.4  
 
Table 2: 
Wealth of Estates Bequeathed by Female Decedents (2013) 
Decedent 
female  
Number of 
estates 
filed 
Total net worth 
for the 
category (in 
billions)  
Average 
wealth of an 
estate (in 
millions)  
Married  130 2.5  19 
Widowed  904 18.9  20.9  
Single  137  1.3  9.8  
 
The IRS data provide a clear illustration of this aspect of the marital 
wealth gap. Married men who died in 2013 held, on average, almost three 
times the wealth of a single male decedent (whether never married, or 
partnered but unmarried).100 Meanwhile, at the time of death, single or 
partnered but unmarried women held, on average, half the wealth of their 
widowed and married counterparts.101 Hence, even among the wealthiest, 
marital status provides some advantage in wealth accumulation. 
                                                     
100. Id. Classifying a taxpayer as “single” means that the individual is unmarried according the 
relevant state law. See IRS, PUBLICATION 501: EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION AND FILING 
INFORMATION 6 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5GK-
3KT3]. In all states, partners who live together in unmarried (and nonregistered) relationships, even 
long term, are not recognized as married. See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. 
REV. 573, 587, 591 (2013). This signifies that “single individuals” in this data might include 
unmarried partners, even if they are in long-term and economically interdependent relationships.  
101. See SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Data, by Year of Death, supra note 99. When it comes to 
women, the large number of widowed women is explained by the fact that wives often outlive their 
husbands. See Barry Johnson & Louise Woodburn,  Analyzing the Weighting Strategy for the Statistics 
of Income 1987 Estate Study, in STATISTICS OF INCOME AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
RESEARCH: 1988–1989, 97, 103 (Beth Kilss & Bettye Jamerson eds., 1990).  
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Married couples are also unique in the greater diversity of their 
portfolio compositions.102 This is important because a diversified portfolio 
might immunize investments from sharp changes in the market. Married 
couples are most likely (compared with all other household categories) to 
be homeowners. According to Mariko Chang’s calculation, based on the 
2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, 83% of white married couples own 
their homes, with a median equity of $85,000, compared with 55% of 
white single men, who own homes with a median equity of $67,000.103 
Fifty-six percent of black married couples own their homes (median 
equity, $50,000) compared with 36% of single black men (median equity, 
$39,000) and 42% of black single women (median equity, $28,000).104 
The same high representation of married couples is true in stock 
ownership, including mutual funds and retirement accounts, where 59% 
of married households own stock at a median value of $23,450. In 
contrast, 45% of single males own stock (at a median value of $13,200), 
and only 36% of single females own stock (at a median value of 
$9,000).105 
In conclusion, the data are consistent in showing a marital wealth gap: 
marital households own more wealth than all other groups, across the 
various types of wealth. The top 10%, and especially the top 1%, are more 
likely to be married than the next 90%. And, even among the wealthiest, 
married couples possess considerably more wealth than their unmarried 
counterparts. The next Part investigates why this is the case. 
III. MARRIAGE AS A WEALTH MAXIMIZER 
This Part probes the causes of the marital wealth gap. It starts with 
scrutinizing the conventional sociological account that views marriage 
itself as explaining the fact that married households hold more wealth than 
other types of family structures. Section B then examines how factors 
related to family background (other than marital status) affect wealth 
accumulation. Section C develops a taxonomy of the ways in which the 
law bears some responsibility for part of the marital wealth gap by 
facilitating, and even encouraging, wealthy spouses to consolidate and 
                                                     
102. Percheski, supra note 96, at 29 (finding that married couples “had the most diverse assets 
portfolio (in terms of number of assets owned), and the highest median value of assets within each 
category”).  
103. CHANG, supra note 22, at 82 tbl.5.7. Lisa Keister’s study, based on the NLSY 1979, finds 
similar results: while married couples represent only 63% of respondents, 85% of them own primary 
residence, as compared to 47% of divorced women and 30% of never-married men. See KEISTER, 
supra note 85, at 216 tbl.8.2 (2005).  
104. CHANG, supra note 22, at 82 tbl.5.7.  
105. Id. at 84 tbl.5.8.  
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maximize their wealth. Finally, section D exposes the role of class-based 
assortative mating in the marital wealth gap, and delineates how the law, 
primarily in its inaction, supports the conditions for these selection 
practices. 
A. Does Marital Behavior Generate Wealth? 
The fact that married couples own significantly more wealth than other 
households may seem completely reasonable: married couples 
consolidate their assets and enjoy the benefits of economies of scale. 
Scholars have often embraced this account as the principal explanation for 
the marital wealth gap. As Keister explains, “Married couples typically 
join assets, income is considerably higher for married couples, and 
expenses tend to be lower for married couples.”106 Likewise, Linda J. 
Waite and Maggie Gallagher argue that “being married in itself seems to 
encourage the creation and retention of wealth.”107 While they concede, 
in one remark, that “[s]ome of the advantage married people have is 
undoubtedly due to selection,” they insist that the behavior of married 
couples, in and of itself, explains why marriage is correlated with 
increased wealth holding.108 
Scholars who advance this hypothesis put forth five main reasons to 
support their claim. First, married households cut expenditures as a result 
of labor specialization and the support that spouses provide one another.109 
For example, when one spouse cooks well, the household can save money 
on restaurants; or when one spouse can do the accounting for the family 
business, then the couple can save money, too. In addition, married 
couples enjoy economies of scale: they divide the payment for housing 
and utilities. Second, when couples marry, they promise each other to be 
there for better and for worse. Such promises serve as the equivalent of 
implied insurance in cases such as loss of employability or filing for 
                                                     
106. KEISTER, supra note 85, at 210.  
107. LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE 
ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 113 (2000). 
108. Id. at 113, 122–23; see also W. BRADFORD WILCOX, JOSEPH PRICE, & ROBERT I. LERMAN, 
STRONG FAMILIES, PROSPEROUS STATES 29 (2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/10/IFS-HomeEconReport-2015-FinalWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X6G-WEEC] (“[M]arried 
couples are more likely to accumulate wealth than singles or cohabiting couples from similar 
backgrounds, even after adjusting for income. Furthermore, married parents receive more financial 
support from both sets of grandparents than do cohabiting couples or single parents.”).  
109. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 107, at 114–15; Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Avia Spivak, 
The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market, 89 J. POL. ECON. 372, 372 (1981). 
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bankruptcy.110 Third, the marital framework and the social norms 
associated with it lead couples to adopt financially responsible 
behavior.111 Other scholars offer a somewhat comparable theory, positing 
that the marital framework motivates males to be more committed to 
earning an income.112 Fourth, married couples get more financial support 
from in-laws and other extended family than do divorced and nonmarried 
couples, who receive much less economic assistance from either partner’s 
family.113 Fifth, divorce has an adverse financial effect, as now the ex-
spouses must use their same income and wealth to maintain two 
households instead of one.114 
These accounts contain some valid observations. It is true that married 
couples enjoy economies of scale, that marriage (and other strong 
relationships) serves as an efficient alternative to insurance, that married 
couples get more financial support from their families, and that divorce 
adversely affects the finances of the family. However, these factors alone 
are insufficient in accounting for the marital wealth gap. 
First, the fact that married couples fare better in terms of wealth 
accumulation shows correlation rather than causation: there is no proof 
that marriage is the cause of greater wealth rather than merely reflecting 
patterns of selection. That is, people with wealth, or with certain 
characteristics that can lead to wealth accumulation, are more likely to get 
married and stay married.115 
In fact, wealth, or lack thereof, is often a reason that poor and non-
wealthy individuals do not get married. Sociologist Daniel Schneider 
recently found that owning a financial asset increases the probability that 
a man will get married by 1.5 percentage points over a man who does not 
own any, and that car ownership increases the probability that a man will 
                                                     
110. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 107, at 115–16.  
111. Id. at 116–17.  
112. WILCOX, PRICE, & LERMAN, supra note 108, at 28.  
113. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 107, at 127–28; see also WILCOX, PRICE, & LERMAN, supra 
note 108, at 29 (“Furthermore, married parents receive more financial support from both sets of 
grandparents than do cohabiting couples or single parents.”). 
114. KEISTER, supra note 25, at 222 (“Likewise when couples separate or divorce, splitting assets 
eliminates the benefit of economies of scale.”); WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 107, at 130. 
115. See GARY R. LEE, THE LIMITS OF MARRIAGE, WHY GETTING EVERYONE MARRIED WON’T 
SOLVE ALL OUR PROBLEMS 119 (2015) (“The research literature leaves no doubt that a major reason 
why married people are economically advantaged is that men with the most potential and actual 
economic advantages are more likely to marry, and they bring these advantages with them into 
marriage.”); Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 159 
(2003) (“That married people are better off than unmarried people does not demonstrate that marriage 
makes people better off. As critics of the marriage movement have long charged, correlation is not 
causation.”).  
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get married by 2.6 percentage points.116 He further found that wealth 
explains marriage patterns—including the lack of marriage—more than 
education and income do.117 
In addition, the argument that married couples are more committed to 
saving and productivity is also problematic. Many studies have found that 
the reason cohabitants do not get married is that they are concerned that 
their partners are not financially responsible.118 Thus, economically 
responsible behavior may indicate selection, rather than marriage’s 
impact on couples’ behaviors. Further, while it is true that divorced 
couples have to maintain two households and, therefore, fare less well 
financially than married couples, this argument also fails to acknowledge 
the correlation-versus-causation problem.119 Consequently, lack of wealth 
may be a reason to divorce—and it provides a more nuanced explanation 
as to why married couples stay together and are wealthier.120 
Second, although married couples do enjoy economies of scale, other 
households can and do enjoy similar benefits.121 Unmarried couples who 
live together, as well as nonconjugal partners who cohabit and are 
economically and emotionally interdependent, all enjoy, to different 
degrees, such advantages. Moreover, surely economies of scale cannot 
explain the marital wealth gap in relation to the top 1%. Therefore, 
economies of scale, alone, cannot explain the marital wealth gap. 
Third, Waite and Gallagher fail to acknowledge that marriage is not 
economically better for everyone, as indicated by the fact that many 
married couples are poor: 46% of households with less than twice the 
                                                     
116. Daniel Schneider, Wealth and the Marital Divide, 117 AM. J. SOC. 627, 658 (2011).  
117. Id. at 648–49.  
118. Pamela J. Smock et al., “Everything’s There Except Money”: How Money Shapes Decisions 
to Marry Among Cohabitors, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 680, 686–92 (2005). 
119. A recent study found that owning significant unsecured debt (i.e., debt unsecured by collateral, 
such as consumer or credit card debt)—to be distinguished from secured debt (like a mortgage)—is 
associated with a reduction in marital stability. Eads & Tach, supra note 91, at 211–12; see also 
Researcher Finds Correlation Between Financial Arguments, Decreased Relationship Satisfaction, 
KAN. ST. U. (July 12, 2013), http://www.k-state.edu/media/newsreleases/jul13/predictingdivorce 
71113.html [https://perma.cc/K5BF-NAN7] (2012 study of more than 4,500 couples indicated that 
financial arguments are the top predictor of divorce). 
120. In addition, starting in the 1980s, the rate of divorce has significantly fluctuated among the 
less-educated while declining for the well-educated. See CARBONE & CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS, 
supra note 13, at 15–16. Because wealth and education have a strong correlation, divorce can be 
equally the result of the couple’s lack of financial wealth.  
121. See Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the “Marriage Penalty” Problem, 33 
VAL. U. L. REV. 907, 912–13 (1999) (“[M]arital partners do not necessarily enjoy above average 
amounts of economies-of-scale benefits.”).  
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federal poverty-level income are married couples.122 And for African 
American families, unlike white households, marriage does not 
significantly elevate the family’s wealth.123 Recent census data support 
the claim that for people on the lower end of the economic spectrum, 
marriage does not increase wealth holding. In 2011, the median net worth 
for a married couple in the lowest quintile was –$3,733; for a male 
householder, –$6,400; and, for a female householder, –$3,202.124 So, 
assuming that marriage patterns are such that poor marry poor (or, more 
likely, do not marry at all), the combination of such partners’ wealth could 
yield more debt.125 
In conclusion, marital behavior only partly explains why married 
couples fare better in terms of wealth accumulation. Wealth plays a 
significant role in the decision about whether to get married in the first 
place and in the decision about whether to stay married.126 And, as this 
Article argues in section C, the rules of family law have direct 
implications for why some married couples are more successful in 
acquiring and retaining wealth—another aspect that the conventional 
account ignores. Similarly, Waite and Gallagher’s argument lacks any 
reference to the effect of intergenerational transfers on wealth creation and 
retention. The following section discusses this issue further.127 
B. Family Background Impacts Wealth Accumulation 
Completely absent from Waite and Gallagher’s account presented 
above is the significant role that family background apart from family 
structure—such as religion, race, education, sexual orientation, and 
inheritance—plays in wealth accumulation and wealth mobility. Family 
                                                     
122. URBAN INST., ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM EIGHT YEARS LATER 11 (2005), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/311198-Assessing-the-New-
Federalism-Eight-Years-Later.PDF [https://perma.cc/ZCJ9-KG9U]. 
123. THOMAS SHAPIRO, TATJANA MESCHEDE & SAM OSORO, INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y, THE 
ROOTS OF THE WIDENING RACIAL WEALTH GAP: EXPLAINING THE BLACK-WHITE ECONOMIC DIVIDE 
4 (2013), http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/Author/shapiro-thomas-m/racialwealthgapbrief.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/75Y3-HBYL].  
124. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION, 2008 PANEL, 
WAVE 10, tbl.1 (2014), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/tables/wealth/2011/wealth 
-asset-ownership/distribution-2011.xlsx [https://perma.cc/R8SP-HUYK]. 
125. In such cases of poverty, it is also likely that marital status has an adverse effect on eligibility 
for need-based welfare. See generally Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 
1291 (2014) (examining cases in which legal recognition of relationships results in financial hardship 
to the couple).  
126. See Schneider, supra note 116, at 648–49, 658.  
127. See infra section III.B.  
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background has a significant effect on households’ ability and likelihood 
to create and retain wealth. This further supports this Article’s argument 
that marital behavior or economies of scale tell a partial story. 
Intergenerational transfers directly assist in wealth accumulation when 
offspring receive an inheritance. Most studies on wealth inequality 
indicate that intergenerational transfers (inter vivos and through 
inheritance) account for at least 50%—and perhaps more than 80%—of 
the net worth of families in the United States.128 This proportion is likely 
going to grow; researchers from the Center on Wealth and Philanthropy 
at Boston College estimate that approximately $59 trillion of wealth will 
be transferred by estates between 2007 and 2061.129 
Intergenerational transfers can also assist indirectly by contributing to 
investments likely to increase wealth accumulation.130 Transfers that 
enable higher education and homeownership can be of particular 
importance.131 Even a small inheritance—such as one used for the down 
payment of a first home, typically the first investment that Americans 
make—“can create a stable base for saving throughout the life course.”132 
Similarly, education has a special correlation to wealth, as it improves 
professional opportunities and can create social contacts that may provide 
business opportunities or even financial help.133 Indeed, recent studies of 
inheritance patterns show that, given longer lifespans and the rising cost 
of higher education, the use of inter vivos transfers has increased.134 
Middle-class Americans typically transfer cash assistance during their 
                                                     
128. Keister & Moller, supra note 30, at 72; JACQUELINE L. ANGEL, INHERITANCE IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA: THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF GIVING ACROSS GENERATIONS 4 (2008); 
Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2182 n.7 (2011) 
(“Economic studies have found that a large fraction (possibly in the range of eighty percent) of 
household wealth in the United States traces to gifts and inheritances, as opposed to participation in 
the labor economy.”).  
129. John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, A Golden Age of Philosophy Still Beckons: National 
Wealth Transfer and Potential for Philanthropy (Boston College Tech. Report, 2014), 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/research_sites/cwp/pdf/A%20Golden%20Age%20of%20Phila
nthropy%20Still%20Bekons.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P8F-ELRK]. 
130. Yamokoski & Keister, supra note 88, at 174.  
131. KEISTER, supra note 85, at 102.  
132. Id.  
133. Id. at 103. 
134. Cf., e.g., AMERIPRISE FIN., MONEY ACROSS GENERATIONS II STUDY: FAMILY FIRST 5 (2012), 
http://newsroom.ameriprise.com/images/20018/MAG%20Research%20Report%20Family%20First
%204-27-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUB3-LAW7] (finding that 71% of surveyed parents financially 
assisted their children with college tuition); John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in 
Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 723 (1988) (“[I]ntergenerational wealth 
transmission no longer occurs primarily upon the death of the parents, but rather, when the children 
are growing up . . . .”). 
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lifetimes rather than transferring assets by bequest,135 suggesting that 
parents’ economic status has a high predictive value for the next 
generation.136 Using the data from the NLSY 1979 cohort, Keister 
concludes that “inheritance has a direct effect on adult wealth.”137 
The role of inheritance in perpetuating the racial wealth gap between 
white families and families of color is especially pivotal, as white families 
are likely to receive significantly larger inheritances.138 For instance, data 
show that, among those who receive an inheritance, whites inherit about 
ten times more wealth than African Americans.139 One study found that, 
even controlling for such individual characteristics as level of education, 
age, gender, and previous income, there are statistically significant 
differences in wealth holdings between African Americans and whites.140 
“Further, parental net worth (wealth)—not parental education, 
occupational prestige, or income—was the variable that mattered . . . .”141 
In short, wealth accumulation and retention are affected by variables 
other than marital behavior, such as parental wealth, intergenerational 
transfers, education, and race. The next section looks at another, more 
hidden, part of the puzzle: the role that the law plays in the marital wealth 
gap. 
C. The Law Confers Wealth Advantages on Affluent Married Couples 
This section adds another layer of explanation for the concentration of 
wealth at the top 10% by showing that the law plays a part in the marital 
wealth gap. It does not assert that these legal mechanisms are the only 
reason for this gap. In fact, as section B shows, various factors correlate 
with wealth holding. Yet, the Article argues that marriage can function as 
a wealth maximizer for those who are already well-off. It divides the laws 
that support wealth concentration by married couples into three 
categories: (1) laws that exacerbate underlying conditions; (2) laws that 
expressly prefer married couples based on their marital status; and (3) 
laws and norms that encourage married households to keep wealth within 
the family. 
                                                     
135. ANGEL, supra note 128, at 16–17.  
136. Strand, supra note 37, at 466.  
137. KEISTER, supra note 85, at 124–25. 
138. Keister & Moller, supra note 30, at 76; Strand, supra note 37, at 467–68.  
139. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 123, at 5.  
140. DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY 
IN AMERICA 47 (10th anniversary ed. 2010). 
141. Strand, supra note 37, at 469 (emphasis in original) (discussing Conley’s study).  
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Two caveats: first, many fringe benefits, which this Article does not 
discuss, are bestowed on married couples, making their lives and finances 
better than those of other households. Such boons, including health 
insurance through a spouse,142 positively affect income and could 
eventually have an impact on wealth accumulation.143 Here, however, the 
Article focuses on rules that directly involve the wealth accumulation of 
the household. Mariko Lin Chang calls such financial benefits “the wealth 
escalators”—a term that represents a variety of assists that “allow people 
to generate wealth at a much faster rate than can be obtained by collecting 
income alone.”144 Further, the Article does not aim to document and 
analyze all of the benefits attendant to marriage that affect wealth but only 
to give a few illustrative rules. Second, in some cases, there could be 
significant financial benefits to being unmarried. One set of such benefits 
is applicable particularly to lower-income households;145 other benefits, 
involving rules that serve to prevent tax avoidance by family members, 
can also provide financial benefit to couples in legally unrecognized 
relationships.146 And there are also marriage penalties, which mainly 
affect wealthy couples with equal incomes.147 While these rules could be 
economically detrimental to married couples, when it comes to the family 
wealth of couples in the top 10%, as explained below, the advantages 
accruing to the status of “married” sometimes outweigh the 
disadvantages.148 
                                                     
142. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 235, 258–59 (2011) (enumerating the rights and benefits that are attached to marriage).  
143. CHANG, supra note 22, at 44 (listing fringe benefits that “are indirectly linked with the wealth 
escalator”). 
144. Id. at 40.  
145. See Aloni, supra note 125, at 1291 (discussing the financial benefits that stem from legal 
nonrecognition of relationships).  
146. Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1529, 1531 n.2 (2008) (surveying some of the major tax rules that are designed to prevent tax 
abuse among family members).  
147. See Martha T. McCluskey, Razing the Citizen: Economic Inequality, Gender, and Marriage 
Tax Reform, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 267, 280–82 
(Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009). 
148. Cf. Kelly A. Moore, The Curious Case of Dr. Jekyll and the Estate Tax Marital Deduction: 
Should Prenuptial Agreements Alter the Relationship?, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255, 262 (2013) (“To 
be sure, the Jekyll approach is more generous than the Hyde approach is restrictive. The focus on 
marriage and reliance on the economic unit presumption is firmly entrenched in the tax code.”). 
Further, because married couples at the very top of wealth ownership often have only one income-
producing spouse, they are more likely to enjoy the marriage benefit than suffer the marriage penalty 
when it comes to income tax. See Katherine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
1, 25–26 (2010) (“[T]he more wealth a married couple has, the more profound their gender 
specialization tends to be.” (footnote omitted)). 
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1. Laws that Exacerbate Underlying Conditions 
This first category—laws that exacerbate underlying conditions—
includes legal mechanisms that create preferences that are most profitable 
to married couples. They do this not by directly singling out married 
couples but, rather, by formalizing certain practices that redound to their 
benefit. This category includes rules that help married couples hold onto 
wealth they already have or to easily convert their income to wealth. 
Capital Gains Exclusion for Sale of Principal Residence: Section 121 
of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the exclusion of up to $250,000 
of capital gains—$500,000 for married taxpayers—on the sale of a home 
owned and used as a principal residence by the taxpayer.149 This rule 
equally applies to unmarried couples who have co-owned and lived in the 
same house in the two years prior, assuming that both partners are listed 
as co-owners on the title; in such case, each can claim up to $250,000 
from the gain (based on their relative shares in the home).150 But, if they 
do not co-own the residency by title, they cannot enjoy the $500,000 
exclusion (unlike married couples who file together). 
In any event, this tax benefit favors wealthy married couples because 
they are most likely to enjoy it. Data about home ownership by married 
couples versus others make it possible for us to estimate the proportion of 
each group seemingly able to use this tax benefit. Indeed, married couples 
own about 80% of homes in the United States.151 Because unmarried 
couples are significantly less likely to own homes than are married 
couples—let alone more expensive properties that appreciate by 
$500,000—this benefit is of limited enjoyment to them and directly 
rewards wealthy married couples.152 Further, a recent report concluded 
                                                     
149. I.R.C. § 121(b) (2012).  
150. Robert Bruss, 1 Year Later: Home Sale Tax Exemption of $250,000/$500,000, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 
17, 1998), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-10-17/news/9810170145_1_tax-free-sale-profits-
principal-residence-tax-exemption [https://perma.cc/HD9X-H8ZN] (“Two (or more) [unmarried] co-
owners of their principal residence can each qualify for up to $250,000 of tax-free home sale profit. 
Of course, each co-owner must meet the two-out-of-the-last-five-years aggregate ownership and 
occupancy requirement.”).  
151. Carlos Garriga, William T. Gavin & Don Schlagenhauf, Recent Trends in Homeownership, 
88 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 397, 399 (2006).  
152. Cf. Rachel Bogardus Drew, 3 Facts about Marriage and Homeownership, HARV. JOINT CTR. 
FOR HOUSING STUD.: HOUSING PERSP. (Dec. 17, 2014), http://housingperspectives.blogspot.ca/2014/ 
12/3-facts-about-marriage-and-homeownership.html [https://perma.cc/ZT8N-JY9B] (“[M]arried 
couples are much more likely to be homeowners than unmarried individuals, due to their generally 
better socio-economic status. Married couples are also more likely to have children, and therefore 
more likely to want larger homes in areas with more family-friendly amenities such as safe 
neighborhoods and good schools.”); Chang, supra note 37, at 116 (data showing that, on average, 
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that even the $250,000 exemption is “not likely to help young, low-
income, and first-time homebuyers.”153 Other data suggest that “[s]ingle 
people of color own homes at the lowest rates and with the lowest 
values.”154 Thus, we can confidently presume that the double benefit, the 
$500,000 exclusion, will be most beneficial to affluent married couples 
who own expensive properties.155 This benefit goes to those who already 
owned a home and saw a great increase in its value.156 It is not a minor 
exclusion: the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation “estimated that 
the exclusion provision saved homeowners $29 billion in income tax in 
fiscal 2016.”157 
Importantly, until 1997, the maximum exclusion amount was 
$125,000, but married couples filing together were entitled only to one 
exclusion between them—i.e., a total of $125,000 for both spouses.158 In 
2007, Congress amended the amount per individual to $250,000 but also 
changed the law so spouses can each claim $250,000—for a total of 
$500,000. That is, this new rule “doubl[es] the exclusion amount for 
unmarried taxpayers, and quadrupl[es] it for married couples.”159 The 
history of the amendment does not explain why the benefit was increased 
so much for married couples.160 
The double exclusion contrasts with the way the income tax system 
grants a marriage bonus to the lower tax brackets and imposes a marriage 
penalty on those who earn the most.161 The income tax system eliminates 
the marriage penalty for lower-earning spouses by simply doubling the 
                                                     
married households own more assets than other household types and have more median capital 
invested in them).  
153. Garriga, Gavin & Shlagenhauf, supra note 151, at 401.  
154. Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, supra note 83, at 232.  
155. Cf. Phyllis C. Taite, Exploding Wealth Inequalities: Does Tax Policy Promote Social Justice 
or Social Injustice?, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 201, 211 (2014) (“Since most middle to lower income 
taxpayers would not likely own homes that would bring these substantial gains, this subsidy is clearly 
intended to benefit the wealthier taxpayers.”).  
156. REEVES, supra note 32, at 105 (“The IRS is generous when we sell our expensive homes too, 
giving us a break from any tax on capital gains. Half the value of this tax break goes to those of us in 
the top income quintile.”).  
157. Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: What Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership?, TAX 
POL’Y CTR.: BRIEFING BOOK (Jan. 7, 2018), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-
tax-benefits-homeownership [https://perma.cc/JX93-7XMU].  
158. Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, supra note 83, at 195–96.  
159. Id. at 196.  
160. Id. at 196 n.29 (“There is no explanation of why the exclusion amount was raised so 
substantially.”). 
161. Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
54 TAX L. REV. 1, 59 (2000).  
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return rates that are imposed on each separately.162 Conversely, the tax 
code sets the rates of upper-earning married couples as the single-earner 
rate. Thus, at the 33% bracket, the cap remains the same for single returns 
and for married joint returns.163 The income tax reflects the notion that 
some penalty is justified when treating affluent married couples.164 But 
the same assumption is not extended to the capital gains exclusion for the 
sale of a principal residence; in the latter case, we simply double the 
benefit, helping the rich to get richer. 
Social Security Retirement Benefits: At first glance, Social Security 
retirement benefits may seem to have little to no connection to the people 
in the top 10% of the wealth distribution. And while it is certainly the case 
that the people in this group are most likely to have private retirement 
accounts, Social Security still gives an advantage in wealth creation.165 
People in the top 10%, including individuals in the top 1%, frequently take 
their Social Security retirement benefit. President Trump once 
acknowledged in an interview, “I have friends that are worth hundreds of 
millions and billions of dollars and get Social Security. They don’t even 
know the check comes in.”166 Manifestly, the money from Social Security 
is more significant to the group in the top 10% than to those in the top 1%. 
Social Security retirement funds are the most common retirement 
income.167 In 2011 almost 25% of married beneficiaries, and 45% of 
unmarried elderly beneficiaries age 65 and older, relied on Social Security 
for at least 90% of their income.168 While marital status is ignored for the 
purposes of paying Social Security (each taxpayer is taxed individually), 
                                                     
162. Mitchell L. Engler & Edward D. Stein, Not Too Separate or Unequal: Marriage Penalty Relief 
After Obergefell, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1086 (2016). 
163. Id.  
164. Cf. Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 612 
(1995) (“Sizeable penalties on marriage were enacted for high-income taxpayers in 1993 for the sole 
purpose of conforming to a specific combination of revenue and distributional targets . . . .”).  
165. In fact, the connections between Social Security and wealth inequality are the subject of 
extensive debate that exceeds the scope of this Article, which focuses on the marital wealth gap only. 
For an argument that Social Security “exacerbates wealth inequality” see Jagadeesh Gokhale & 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Impact of Social Security and Other Factors on the Distribution of Wealth, 
in THE DISTRIBUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 85, 101–06 
(Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman eds., 2002). 
166. Heather Haddon, Donald Trump: My Rich Friends Shouldn’t Take Social Security, WALL ST. 
J.: WASH. WIRE (Oct. 12, 2015, 3:10 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/10/12/donald-
trump-my-rich-friends-shouldnt-take-social-security/ [https://perma.cc/2RKW-4YBY]. 
167. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-33, RETIREMENT SECURITY: TRENDS IN 
MARRIAGE AND WORK PATTERNS MAY INCREASE ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY FOR SOME RETIREES 
1 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660202.pdf [https://perma.cc/PPH6-B55Q]. 
168. Id. at 7.  
04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  4:13 PM 
32 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1 
 
benefits are related to marital status, and Social Security allotments 
privilege married couples in several ways.169 The data imply that high-
earning married couples collect their Social Security benefits: in 2010, 
approximately 6% of the recipients of Social Security distributions were 
married couples with an annual income of $200,000 or more.170 Only 
0.4% of the beneficiaries with $200,000 or more per year were 
unmarried.171 
At the very basic level, a married individual, or previously married 
individual (widowed or divorced, if married for more than ten years), is 
eligible to receive up to 50% of a spouse’s (or ex-spouse’s) benefit 
amount, based on the spouse’s contribution alone.172 That is, even if a 
married, divorced, or widowed person did not work and therefore is 
ineligible to receive personal Social Security retirement benefits, that 
person is entitled to Social Security funds based upon the spouse’s 
contribution.173 The number of recipients who receive Social Security 
solely based on spousal contributions has declined significantly in the past 
half century; yet, in 2011, 9% of women received Social Security income 
based on spousal contribution, and 16% received widow benefits based 
exclusively on their spouse’s work.174 
This asset is unavailable to never-married people or people married less 
than ten years. The qualification based on an ex-spouse’s work recognizes 
the contribution of the nonworking spouse to the household, likely by 
providing support and care to the working spouse.175 This special 
treatment can reflect a common pattern in which one spouse leaves the 
paid workforce, or works half time, to care for the household. Yet, this 
benefit is still under-inclusive as unmarried partners can be economically 
and emotionally interdependent, too. Indeed, according to an analysis by 
                                                     
169. Wendy Richards, Comment, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias 
Perspective: It Is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 611, 633.  
170. Income of the Population 55 or Older, 2010, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., at tbl.3.A2, 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/income_pop55/2010/sect03.html#table3.a2 
[https://perma.cc/GDY3-YNPR] (2.0% were 55–61, 1.5% 62–64, and 2.7% 65 and older).  
171. Id.  
172. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 167, at 6 tbl.1.  
173. Social Security benefits based on spousal contribution go predominantly to women, as less 
than 1% who received benefits in 2012 based on their spouse were male. See id. at 27 n.33.  
174. Id. at 27. 
175. Although collecting social security based on an ex-spouse’s work does not reduce an ex-
spouse’s eligibility to benefit. Retirement Planner: If You Are Divorced, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/divspouse.html [https://perma.cc/M46W-VH7T] (“The amount 
of benefits you get has no effect on the amount of benefits your ex-spouse or their current spouse may 
receive.” (emphasis deleted)).  
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the Social Security Administration, in 2009, 16% of women aged fifty to 
fifty-nine were ineligible to receive Social Security based on spousal 
contribution (an increase from 8% in 1990).176 
In addition, until 2015, the rules of claiming retirement funds gave 
another welcome advantage to married couples: this was a Social Security 
filing strategy, known as “file and suspend,” that allowed married couples 
to enjoy an 8% annual increase in social security payouts.177 Married or 
single, people have always been able to delay getting their Social Security 
retirement funds in order to receive a larger amount when they do start 
collecting. But during this “waiting period,” married persons—under the 
eliminated loophole—could simultaneously collect other Social Security 
benefits based on their spouse’s eligibility. Accordingly, when the 
suspending spouse (Spouse A) filed and suspended in regard to Spouse 
A’s own benefits, this spouse was entitled to start receiving payments from 
Spouse B’s Social Security fund—and, all that while, Spouse A’s 
suspended benefits continued to grow. This option was available only to 
those able to delay getting their own retirement payouts and who had 
spouses entitled to such—in other words, to those doing well financially. 
In 2015, President Obama’s budget deal eliminated this loophole. 
Dropping “file and suspend” was a good step in the right direction, but 
Social Security still provides preferential treatment to married couples,178 
which is yet another factor in retention of their wealth and their ability to 
transfer more of it to the next generation. 
2. Laws that Distinguish Couples Based on Marital Status 
Under this category, the Article includes legal mechanisms that treat 
married couples uniquely, based solely on marital status, and thus result 
in paving the way for wealth accumulation. It starts with retirement plans 
and then moves to rules concerning intramarital wealth transfers. 
                                                     
176. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 167, at 28.  
177. Jonnelle Marte, One of the Most Lucrative Social Security Strategies for Married Couples Is 
Being Eliminated, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-
there/wp/2015/11/03/one-of-the-most-lucrative-social-security-strategies-for-married-couples-is-
being-eliminated/ [https://perma.cc/G37D-S9VX]. 
178. Steve Vernon, How Married Couples Can Max Out Their Social Security, CBS NEWS: 
MONEYWATCH (Feb. 5, 2016, 5:45 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-married-couples-can-
max-out-their-social-security/ [https://perma.cc/PGH2-2VV8]; see also Tom Anderson, Married 
Couples Have 81 Ways to Claim Social Security. Here’s How to Maximize Your Benefits, CNBC 
(June 6, 2017, 8:06 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/02/how-married-couples-can-maximize-
their-social-security-benefits.html [https://perma.cc/664Z-KNUG] (“The Social Security shopping 
mall has 81 stores for married couples . . . .”).  
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Retirement Plans: Retirement assets are the middle class’s second-
largest component of wealth (after home ownership).179 Retirement plans 
convert income into wealth directly and thus serve as a major wealth 
escalator.180 In 2010, an estimated 71% of married households age 50–64 
years old had some form of retirement plan (with a median of $122,560 
in their retirement plan), while only 39% of single male households 
(median of $50,000) and 48% of single female households (median of 
$32,800) had such plans.181 In 2015, almost 12,000 estate tax returns were 
filed at the IRS.182 Around 65% of these estates (7,804) had retirement 
assets that amounted to close to $11 billion.183 
Retirement savings offer a few benefits to married couples that are 
unavailable to single or unmarried couples.184 One example is Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), one of the growing types of retirement 
savings. In 2013, IRAs included assets worth approximately $6 trillion, 
“accounting for 28 percent of U.S. retirement assets.”185 IRAs allow 
eligible contributors to receive tax deductions, to defer tax on growth and 
earnings, and, depending on eligibility, may provide nonrefundable tax 
credits.186 
IRAs provide some advantages to married couples over singles or 
unmarried couples. First, for one to contribute money to an IRA, the 
contributor must have earned taxable income.187 However, married 
persons who file a joint tax return can contribute to IRAs if their spouses 
have taxable compensation.188 The implication is that a working spouse 
can contribute $5,500 annually (or $6,500 if the nonworking spouse is 
over fifty) for the nonworking spouse. At the same time, a single person 
who is not making any income cannot contribute to IRAs (and cannot have 
someone else contribute on their behalf), and a single earning person 
                                                     
179. CHANG, supra note 22, at 10.  
180. Id. at 40.  
181. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 167, at 33–34.  
182. SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics Filing Year Table 1, supra note 98 (click link to table  
for 2015).  
183. See id. 
184. See Ruth Colker, The Freedom to Choose to Marry, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 383, 420 
(2015) (arguing that “[t]he benefits of marriage are important when it is time to retire, especially if 
the couple has experienced a traditional marriage”). 
185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 167, at 10.  
186. Denise Appleby, IRA Contributions: Deductions and Tax Credits, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/retirement/05/022105.asp [https://perma.cc/82GJ-2PE3]. 
187. Topic No. 451—Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs), IRS (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc451.html [https://perma.cc/ZY8Y-WN45]. 
188. Id.  
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cannot support another person. IRAs also grant some help, not available 
to others, in early withdrawals of funds without penalty to spouses. For 
example, an IRA holder may withdraw funds early, without penalty, if the 
money is used to pay qualified higher-education expenses incurred by the 
spouse.189 
Second, while an unmarried individual can inherit IRA funds, just as a 
surviving spouse can, married couples have some financial advantages in 
such a scenario. Surviving spouses can roll over the inherited funds from 
the deceased spouse’s IRA into their own IRA, thus enjoying continued 
tax deferral.190 If a surviving spouse is under fifty-nine and the 
contributing spouse died before the latter was seventy years old, the 
surviving spouse will not be taxed on the required minimum distribution 
until the surviving spouse reaches the age of seventy.191 Conversely, 
beneficiaries of an IRA who are not spouses cannot roll over the funds 
into their IRA or continue contributing to the IRA.192 A non-spouse 
beneficiary who inherits IRA funds has a few options, depending on the 
age of the IRA holder. If the IRA owner was younger than 70.5 years (the 
mandated time at which the funds distribution begins), then the non-
spouse beneficiary has three options: lump-sum distribution; distributions 
over a five-year period; or distributions spread over the beneficiary’s life 
expectancy, with the first distribution beginning within a year of 
inheritance.193 While the life expectancy option “is preferable to a lump-
sum distribution . . . it is not as attractive as a spousal rollover.”194 In sum, 
the rules offer beneficiaries who are not surviving spouses less flexibility 
in tax planning to maximize the funds from the IRA. 
Wealth Consolidators: Another set of taxation rules privileges married 
couples over all other family types, enabling them to transfer wealth 
                                                     
189. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E) (2012).  
190. See Clark v. Rameker, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2245 (2014) (“An inherited IRA is a 
traditional or Roth IRA that has been inherited after its owner’s death. . . . If the heir is the owner’s 
spouse, as is often the case, the spouse has a choice: He or she may ‘roll over’ the IRA funds into his 
or her own IRA, or he or she may keep the IRA as an inherited IRA . . . .” (citations omitted)).  
191. Ray Martin, How to Inherit an IRA, CBS NEWS (Sept. 13, 2013, 10:55 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/how-to-inherit-an-ira/ [https://perma.cc/J5B8-3G3H]. 
192. I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(C); Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2245 (“When anyone other than the owner’s spouse 
inherits the IRA, he or she may not roll over the funds; the only option is to hold the IRA as an 
inherited account.”).  
193. See Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2245; IRS, PUBLICATION 590-B: DISTRIBUTIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL 
RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS (IRAS) 9–11 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p590b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FC3P-LYER] (discussing the rules concerning individual designated beneficiaries).  
194. SID MITTRA, ANANDI P. SAHU & BRIAN FISCHER, PRACTICING FINANCIAL PLANNING: FOR 
PROFESSIONALS AND CFP® ASPIRANTS 774 (2016). 
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between the spouses—and to their heirs—in a way that significantly 
enhances wealth accumulation and retention. Married couples are the 
wealthiest group in the United States,195 and marriage is likely the best 
and most efficient estate-planning tool, resulting in a substantial economic 
boon for married couples.196 
Since the enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 
spouses can transfer 100% of their assets between each other without 
incurring tax consequences, an estate tool commonly known as the 
“marital deduction.”197 This means that married couples are treated as one 
economic unit for purposes of estate and gift taxes.198 The benefit of the 
marital deduction is that it allows spouses to strategically transfer wealth 
from the wealthier spouse to the less wealthy spouse, and, in that way, to 
maximize favorable tax rules (tax deductions, exemptions, exclusions, 
credits, and lower tax rates).199 Additionally, the transfer allows spouses 
to delay the payment of estate tax until the death of the surviving 
spouse.200 
In addition to the marital deduction, individuals (unmarried or married) 
receive a unified credit for both estate and gift taxes and can transfer $5.45 
million without taxation to persons other than their spouses. This amount 
is double for married couples ($10.90 million in 2016).201 
                                                     
195. CHANG, supra note 22, at 20.  
196. Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage and Wealth 
Transfer-Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757, 759 (2004) (“Marriage is an excellent estate planning 
strategy.”); Joshua S. Rubenstein, Estate Planning for Unmarried Partners, N.Y.U. REV. EMP. 
BENEFITS § 21.01 (2008), https://www.kattenlaw.com/files/19823_Rubenstein—Chapter 
—Estate_Planning_for_Unmarried.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LCR-AACX] (“From an estate planning 
perspective, many estate planning devices favor married couples—particularly those that involve the 
marital deduction. There are any number of loopholes to favored estate planning devices over the 
years that have been “plugged” for spouses but not for unmarried partners.”).  
197. Moore, supra note 148, at 255, 261 (“A primary justification for bestowing benefits on 
married taxpayers in the income and transfer tax systems, currently, is the policy pronouncement that 
married individuals constitute economic units and should not be required to account for intramarriage 
transfers, but only for transfers outside of the economic unit.”).  
198. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97–34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172, 301–05 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
199. Crawford, supra note 196, at 759.  
200. Id.  
201. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (2012). Furthermore, as of 2015, donors of lifetime gifts are provided an 
annual exclusion of $14,000 per donee. If the non-donor spouse consents to split the gift with the 
donor spouse, then the annual exclusion is $28,000 per donee. H.R. REP. NO. 114–64, at 5 (2015). 
Finally, a gift or bequest of appreciated (or loss) property is not an income-tax realization event for 
the transferor. This means that property acquired from a decedent’s estate generally takes a stepped-
up basis. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (“[T]he basis of property in the hands of a person acquiring the property 
from a decedent or to whom the property passed from a decedent shall, if not sold, exchanged, or 
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The double exclusion that each individual spouse enjoys in the area of 
wealth taxation should not be taken for granted. In some other provisions 
of the tax code, married couples do not receive such a “double deduction”; 
rather, they have a separate tax rate equal to less than the doubled amount 
of one individual.202 In other cases, the advantage that the spouses can 
claim together is equal to what one individual may claim. For instance, 
married couples can apply up to $3,000 of net capital losses against 
ordinary income, the same amount an individual can apply.203 
Further, since 2010, married couples have another helpful implement 
in their estate tax toolkit: portability.204 Prior to the enactment of 
portability, spouses could not transfer the estate tax credit ($5.45 million 
per spouse in 2016) to the surviving spouse; the credit only applied to the 
individual decedent’s taxable estate.205 Spouses could plan, and often have 
planned, transfers of wealth between themselves to maximize the use of 
the unified credit, but this requires some arranging as well as foresight 
into which spouse will die first.206 Portability makes such planning easier 
because it allows the surviving spouse to use the deceased spouse’s 
unused amount of unified credit. For example: a married couple consists 
of Spouse A, who has not used his unified credit before death and has left 
a $2 million estate to his son, and Spouse B, who, after the death of Spouse 
A, owns assets worth $2 million dollars and has exhausted his amount of 
unified credit by transferring to their son a gift worth $5.45 million. 
Before portability, Spouse B would have needed to transfer $2 million 
worth of assets to Spouse A prior to the latter’s death, to take advantage 
of Spouse A’s available exemption at his death. With portability, Spouse 
                                                     
otherwise disposed of before the decedent’s death by such person, be . . . the fair market value of the 
property at the date of the decedent’s death.”).  
202. See Seto, supra note 146, at 1560–80 (providing a detailed account of anti-abuse tax 
provisions under which married couples’ tax liability does not equal double the individual’s; rather, 
married couples receive specific rates for their benefits).  
203. I.R.C. § 1211; Tessa R. Davis, Mapping the Families of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 179, 235 (2015) (“Yet, when that same married couple calculates capital gain for 
the year, the Code limits their losses to the same amount as that of a single individual: $3000.”).  
204. In 2010, the portability provision was only temporary. See Tax Relief, Unemployment 
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 303, 124 Stat. 3296, 
3302–04. In 2012, it became permanent. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
240, § 101(c)(2), 126 Stat. 2313, 2318. 
205. Steve L. Dellinger & Nathan L. Wadlinger, The Portability Pill: Examining the Trial Stages 
of Federal Estate and Gift Tax Spousal Portability, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 367, 368–69 
(2012). 
206. Kerry A. Ryan, Marital Sharing of Transfer Tax Exemptions, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1067 
(2016).  
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A’s $3.45 million unused credit is available to Spouse B to guarantee his 
future gratuitous transfers to anyone he would like.207 
But while it seems that portability merely provides married couples an 
efficient estate-planning tool by making it easier to exhaust the available 
credits, it actually “allow[s] spouses to obtain better tax results than they 
could have with the best estate planning.”208 While with estate planning, 
as described in the example above, the couple could have avoided taxes 
on $9.45 million (Spouse B uses his $5.45 million credit and transfers 
assets worth $2 million to Spouse A; Spouse A uses $2 million of his own 
credit), with portability, this couple can shelter up to $10.90 million 
(Spouse A transfers his unused credit of $3.45 million in addition to the 
$2 million he used and the $5.45 that Spouse B used). Moreover, the 
surviving spouse could use this extra time to consume some part of the 
estate and reduce the estate tax. Congress was aware that portability 
provides an extra benefit (beyond the ease of planning) solely to married 
couples but chose to keep it this way.209 “As such, portability becomes a 
quasi-tax credit available only to married individuals.”210 
Although portability has been applauded by some as a relatively 
efficient estate-planning tool that is consistent with the direction of estate 
tax,211 law professor Phyllis Taite offers a strong critique of portability. 
She argues that “[t]he primary, if not sole function, of the portability 
provision is to permit more wealth transmission to persons other than a 
surviving spouse. As such, portability is another form of shifting more 
wealth to the already wealthiest households.”212 Indeed, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation estimates that 54% of estates would benefit from 
portability after ten years.213 
                                                     
207. Id. at 1067–68.  
208. Id. at 1069.  
209. Id.  
210. Dellinger & Wadlinger, supra note 205, at 397. Furthermore, an additional benefit of 
portability is that it allows the couple to use a double step-up basis: calculating the estate as fair market 
value on the date of the decedent’s death and thus avoiding capital gain on the appreciation—the first 
step-up basis comes when the decedent spouse dies, and then the second step-up in basis is realized 
at the surviving spouse’s death. Id.  
211. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS 
WITHIN A FAMILY: A DISCUSSION OF SELECTED AREAS FOR POSSIBLE REFORM 10 (2008) 
(“Therefore, allowing for portability between spouses of unused exemption arguably would contribute 
to simplicity and facilitate compliance with the law, because it largely would eliminate the need for 
couples to employ the credit shelter trust strategy or to monitor and adjust the titling of assets.”).  
212. Taite, supra note 155, at 216. 
213. Dellinger & Wadlinger, supra note 205, at 407. 
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These benefits—the marital deduction and portability—are not 
available to unmarried couples. The result is a significant advantage to the 
wealthiest married couples over other households.214 But not only are 
these rules under-inclusive––that is, they do not treat nonmarried families 
the same as married households––the result is that they allow those who 
are already well-off to gain more wealth. With some estate planning, these 
benefits essentially let married couples lower their estate tax considerably, 
or even avoid it altogether, and thereby keep their fortunes in the family. 
Marriage, in effect, serves as a tax maximizer to preserve wealth within 
the family. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the Tax 
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act 
of 2010—which made the estate tax rate 35%, with an applicable 
exclusion amount of $5 million—would cost $67.5 billion over the years 
2011 to 2015.215 
Data available from 2010 show how these massive exemptions 
encourage intergenerational transfers by married households. The data 
reveal that, in just over half of all estate tax returns, the decedents were 
married; in another 36%, they were widowed.216 Only 13% of decedents 
were single, divorced, or separated.217 Further, over 97% of the estates of 
married decedents, and 48% of estates overall, reported deductions for 
marital bequests, for a total of $42 billion.218 Only 9% of estates with a 
marital bequest owed estate tax.219 
3. Privatization Norms Encourage Married Couples to Keep Wealth 
in the Family 
There are “strong cultural expectations in the United States for wealth 
to remain in the immediate family through bequests to spouses and 
children.”220 Rules concerning intergenerational transfers reinforce these 
                                                     
214. Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Filing 
in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 644 (“As a result, the income, estate, and gift tax rules 
permit the shifting of substantial amounts of property within most nuclear and extended traditional 
families free of concerns about federal taxes.”).  
215. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE 
“TAX RELIEF, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REAUTHORIZATION, AND JOB CREATION ACT OF 2010” 
4 (2010). 
216. IRS, ESTATE TAX STATISTICS (2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10esesttaxsnap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3EED-R4PF]. 
217. Id.  
218. Id.  
219. Id.  
220. Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, Jr., Estate Inheritance: A Sociological Lacuna, 59 
SOC. INQUIRY 7, 18 (1989). 
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cultural norms, encouraging families to keep their wealth for the next 
generation rather than to redistribute it outside the family. Some rules 
provide clear incentives to keep wealth within the family, while others 
send a message that doing so is the norm.221 
These conventions are often stronger with regard to the married 
household. Federal estate and gift tax rules provide many benefits to 
married couples that encourage them to transfer wealth between 
themselves and to minimize the amount subject to the estate tax—rules 
that are not extended to nonmarried couples, to other relatives, or to 
nonfamily members.222 The clearest example of legal directives that 
incentivize interspousal transfers are the rules discussed in section II.C.2, 
above, whose main justification is to reward bequests within the married 
family.223 
State inheritance laws provide similar incentives; they sometimes tax 
inheritance to family members (other than the spouse) more favorably 
than inheritance to nonfamily members.224 For example, the general 
inheritance tax rate in Pennsylvania is 15%, which is reduced to 12% for 
transfers to siblings, a mere 4.5% for transfers to lineal heirs, and 0% to 
surviving spouses.225 In Kentucky, surviving spouses, parents, children, 
grandchildren, siblings, and half-siblings are entirely exempt from paying 
inheritance taxes.226 Such laws exemplify how legal devices reflect and 
perpetuate the social norm of encouraging wealth concentration within 
families. This effect is even more pronounced with regard to married 
                                                     
221. Other rules that provide incentives to keep wealth within the family, and are not discussed in 
this subsection, include I.R.C. § 6166, which provides a ten-year extension of time to pay estate tax 
where the estate consists of family-owned business interests; and I.R.C. § 2032A, which provides 
special valuation rules for real estate transferred to a “member of the decedent’s family.” For 
discussion of these provisions see Bridget J. Crawford, The Profits and Penalties of Kinship: 
Conflicting Meanings of Family in Estate Tax Law, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 63 (2005).  
222. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 196, at 792; Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth 
Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1219 (1983). 
223. See Anne L. Alstott, Commentary Family Values, Inheritance Law, and Inheritance Taxation, 
63 TAX L. REV. 123, 131–32 (2009) (“[T]he state might craft an inheritance tax so that it rewards gifts 
and bequests within the family. The U.S. federal estate tax arguably does something like this by giving 
an unlimited spousal exemption.”).  
224. Margaret Ryznar, The Odd Couple: The Estate Tax and Family Law, 76 LA. L. REV. 523, 529 
(2015).  
225. Inheritance Tax for Pennsylvania Residents, PA. DEP’T REVENUE, http://www. 
montcopa.org/284/Inheritance-Tax-for-Pennsylvania-Residen [https://perma.cc/46WU-2PQQ]. 
226. Whereas close lineal relatives are exempt from the Kentucky inheritance tax, other 
beneficiaries must pay anywhere between 4% and 16%. See Mary Randolph, Kentucky Inheritance 
Tax, NOLO, http://www.executorscorner.com/resources/kentucky-inheritance-tax.html [https:// 
perma.cc/9AWS-R9U2].  
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couples. As mentioned above, in Pennsylvania and Kentucky, property 
inherited from a spouse is exempt from inheritance tax.227 
In addition, by providing protection from disinheritance to a spouse, 
the state communicates that wealth, or at least a part of it, should stay in 
the family and particularly the marital family.228 Likewise, when a person 
dies intestate, the default rules designate the spouse and children—and, in 
their absence, other relatives—as the primary beneficiaries.229 
This set of legal rules also attests to a strong norm of privatization of 
support and dependency in the United States. Privatizing support is part 
of a larger neoliberal approach that seeks to transfer economic risks from 
the collective to families themselves.230 In neoliberal thought, the role of 
marriage is to “impose discipline and privatized dependency among the 
poor.”231 Marriage is a “gendered institution for privatizing social costs—
women, dependent on husbands or the low-wage job market, must bear 
responsibility for child care costs.”232 The ideology that the married 
family is at the center of society, and is the primary unit for support in 
time of economic crises, sends a signal that it is the spouses’ role to take 
care of one another. Keeping wealth within the family might be part of the 
spouses’ roles. 
Privatization of support is one of the keystones of family law in the 
United States.233 The state “recognizes and bestows benefits on families 
so that they will serve a private welfare function, minimizing reliance on 
state and federal coffers.”234 Various doctrines enforce the role of the 
family in caregiving and general support. For instance, Maxine Eichner 
shows how aspects of employment law related to caregiving 
                                                     
227. PA. DEP’T REVENUE, supra note 225. 
228. The justifications for elective share have been the subjects of extensive debates. The current 
prevailing theory is that elective share stems from marriage as an economic partnership. As such, the 
doctrine recognizes the surviving spouse’s contribution to the relationship, and elective share serves 
as a form of restitution or as an implied contract. See Rena C. Seplowitz, Transfers Prior to Marriage 
and the Uniform Probate Code’s Redesigned Elective Share—Why the Partnership Is Not Yet 
Complete, 25 IND. L. REV. 1, 48 (1991) (discussing the different theories for elective share). Thus, 
the doctrine of elective share protects spouses from losing their share based on their contributions, 
but it adds another layer of laws that assume that wealth should remain in the family.  
229. Strand, supra note 37, at 464.  
230. Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs? Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality, 
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1558 (2006).  
231. LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY? NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND 
THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 64 (2003).  
232. Id.  
233. Ryznar, supra note 224, at 540–45. 
234. Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 
1866–67 (2014). 
04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  4:13 PM 
42 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1 
 
responsibility—particularly Title VII and the Family and Medical Leave 
Act—reflect the notion that dependency and care are private matters 
performed without state support.235 As the state has created many 
mechanisms that enforce the ideal of family as a private support system, 
transfer of wealth within the family falls squarely into this ideology and 
may incentivize families to retain wealth in order to fulfil their role as 
private providers of such basic needs as health, caregiving, and education. 
The ideology that shifts the burden of care to private hands impacts 
society’s rich, too. To succeed in a world in which goods like education 
are private, affluent families must preserve wealth. For families at the top 
10% of wealth distribution it means paying for quality care from a young 
age, living in school districts in which housing is more expensive, and 
saving money for college, to name only a few items. For families at the 
top 1%, privatization looks different. A recent article in Town and 
Country magazine provides a good anecdote on why wealthy families 
want to accumulate wealth.236 The article aimed to imagine the net worth 
that “a typical wealthy family living in New York City”—which 
constitutes “a married couple in their forties with two teenage kids”—
needs for living.237 The amount calculated was $190 million to sustain a 
lifestyle of an uber-rich New York family and includes “the cost of a no-
expense-spared educational strategy that included extensive private 
tutoring, music lessons, sports, enrichment activities, private school, trips 
abroad, and, ultimately, four years in the Ivy League.”238 This amount is 
estimated at $1.7 million per child. Norms of privatization are obviously 
impacting socioeconomic groups in significantly different ways, but 
privatization has an impact on all families. 
To conclude, the marital wealth gap is aggravated by a host of rules and 
norms that support accumulation of wealth within married households and 
are either unavailable to nonmarried households or beneficial primarily to 
married couples. The next section looks at another, final elucidation of the 
marital wealth gap. 
                                                     
235. MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S 
POLITICAL IDEALS 28–39 (2010).  
236. Norman Vanamee, Here’s Exactly How Much Money You Need to Be Happy, TOWN & 
COUNTRY (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.townandcountrymag.com/society/money-and-power/a1352 
8013/how-much-money-you-need-to-be-happy/ [https://perma.cc/QGK5-TC49]. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
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D. Assortative Mating Exacerbates Wealth Inequality 
The marital wealth gap has another, more subtle, explanation: the 
extent to which wealth marries wealth. Class-based mating patterns, 
founded on parental and personal wealth, are a great contributor to the 
growing wealth inequality. This section begins by unveiling how and why 
positive assortative mating patterns keep accelerating, and how they 
increase wealth inequality in the United States. It then contends that the 
law entrenches or even exacerbates these patterns by supporting, and 
failing to combat, the conditions for the growth of positive assortative 
mating. 
1. Individuals Select Partners Based on Parental Wealth 
The patterns of marriage and partner selection have an effect on wealth 
distribution. Put simply, if people marry people from similar economic 
strata, the result is less social mobility and more concentration of wealth, 
because inherited fortunes are not generally distributed away from the 
lineal heirs.239 As Thomas Piketty explains, 
At the level of the family, it is obvious why positive assortative 
mating can contribute to make inequality more persistent across 
generations: if children’s abilities depend on the characteristics of 
both parents, then the fact that men and women with similar 
characteristics tend to mate together makes intergenerational 
mobility lower than it would be under random matching.240 
If, on the other hand, individuals marry people from higher economic 
groups, then the concentration of inherited wealth will likely decrease and 
the distribution of inherited wealth is likely to equalize over 
generations.241 Undeniably, acquiring wealth through marriage is a 
familiar story in United States culture, and most people do not oppose 
acquiring wealth by marriage (as opposed to acquiring wealth through 
inheritance).242 Some even view it as a characteristic of a meritocracy—
                                                     
239. OSBERG, supra note 24, at 203.  
240. Thomas Piketty, Theories of Persistent Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 429, 467 (Anthony B. Atkinson & Franois Bourguignon eds., 
2000). 
241. OSBERG, supra note 24, at 203. 
242. McNamee & Miller, supra note 66, at 195; see also Matthew Clayton, Equal Inheritance: An 
Anti-perfectionist View, in INHERITED WEALTH, JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 98, 98 (John Cunliffe, Guido 
Erreygers eds., 2013) (“[U]nequal inheritance, which produces unequal life chances, appears to be 
problematic from the point of view of egalitarian justice. . . . [T]he sheer good luck of being born to 
wealthy parents, for example, is not, according to most egalitarians, a cause of inequality that justifies 
the inequality it causes.” (citation omitted)).  
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using personality and perhaps physical appearance to achieve upward 
mobility.243 One study found that the majority of people who identify as 
poor or working class prefer that their children “marry up.”244 
To find out whether individuals in a certain society tend to marry 
people from different socioeconomic backgrounds, we need to understand 
the factors that lead individuals to select certain partners. This section 
examines patterns of “assortative mating”—the term sociologists and 
economists use to describe a phenomenon in which individuals sort 
partners who share similar characteristics (homogenous selection).245 
Generally, a higher degree of assortative mating indicates that people 
marry others with a similar background.246 Studies on patterns of partner 
selection examine the influence of factors relevant to the family of origin, 
such as parental education, income, and wealth, and their impact on mate 
sorting.247 Likewise, these studies often explore the effect of spouses’ 
individual characteristics––such as race, ethnicity, religion, 
attractiveness, income, and level of education––on partner sorting.248 
The effect of educational background on partnership selection is of 
special interest in sociology and is a widely explored topic.249 In the 
United States, patterns of marriage selection based on education have 
become increasingly homogenous and less random.250 In fact, rates of 
positive assortative mating based on education grew significantly between 
the beginning and end of the twentieth century. Between the 1940s and 
                                                     
243. McNamee & Miller, supra note 66, at 195.  
244. LEONARD BEEGHLEY, STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 110 
(2008).  
245. See HANS PETER BLOSSFELD & ANDREAS TIMM, WHO MARRIES WHOM? EDUCATIONAL 
SYSTEMS AS MARRIAGE MARKETS IN MODERN SOCIETIES 1–6 (2003); Ana Swanson, The Real 
Reason Some People End Up with Partners Who Are Way More Attractive, WASH. POST (May 3, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/03/the-real-reason-some-people-
end-up-with-partners-who-are-way-more-attractive/ [https://perma.cc/SLY3-6KKH] (“[C]ouples 
tend to be more similar in many respects—including their genetics, physical attractiveness and 
cultural characteristics such as religion, politics and socioeconomic status—than two randomly 
selected people would be. Scientists call this ‘assortative mating.’”).  
246. See BLOSSFELD & TIMM, supra note 245, at 1–6.  
247. Id. at 10.  
248. See, e.g., Yue Qian, Gender Asymmetry in Educational and Income Assortative Marriage, 79 
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 318, 322 (2017) (“Income assortative mating has received far less attention than 
educational assortative mating. Yet in recent decades, income may have become increasingly 
important in the selection of marriage partners.”); Megan M. Sweeney & Maria Cancian, The 
Changing Importance of Economic Prospects for Assortative Mating, CAL. CTR. FOR POPULATION 
RESEARCH 4 (2001), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.4866&rep=rep 
1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/4BTC-7YUL]. 
249. See Blossfeld & Timm, supra note 245, at 3–5; Qian, supra note 248, at 321.  
250. See, e.g., Qian, supra note 248, at 331–33 (analyzing marriage trends from the 1980s onward). 
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1960s, marriage patterns were more class heterogenic than they are 
now.251 Between the 1960s and today, educational positive assortative 
mating became much more prevalent, leading to a decrease in cross-class 
marriages.252 Indeed, the percentage of college graduates who marry other 
college graduates has doubled since the 1960s.253 The chance that a 
woman with a college degree will marry someone who did not go beyond 
a high school education is one in ten.254 This change in marriage 
homogeny exists even when controlling for the growing rate of women 
who pursue higher education, and hence cannot be attributed only to 
women closing the education gap during these years.255 
Prospective partners do not select their partners based only on similar 
income, profession, or educational level. A recent study of couples who 
were married in 1998 documented a strong correlation between parental 
wealth and marriage selection patterns; it found that individuals are very 
likely to marry spouses whose parents have wealth similar to that of their 
own parents.256 This study shows that it is especially unlikely for people 
from opposite ends of the quintile (the wealthiest and the least wealthy) 
to marry one another. For example, only 7% of husbands with parents in 
the lowest quintile of parental wealth distribution were married to women 
with parents in the top quintile of the parental wealth distribution.257 The 
study concludes, “People are hugely likely to marry spouses from similar 
parental backgrounds, and the further a spouse’s parental background is 
from their own, the sharply lower the incidence of marriage.”258 
Importantly, the study found a higher degree of assortative mating based 
                                                     
251. CARBONE & CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS, supra note 13, at 62.  
252. Christine R. Schwartz & Robert D. Mare, Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage From 
1940 to 2003, 42 DEMOGRAPHY 621, 641 (2015) (“The increasing resemblance of spouses in terms 
of educational attainment . . . through the late 1980s continued through the 1990s and into the twenty-
first century.”).  
253. See Jeremy Greenwood, Nezih Guner, Georgi Kocharkov & Cezar Santos, Marry Your Like: 
Assortative Mating and Income Inequality 10 tbl.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 19829, 2014).  
254. ALISON WOLF, THE XX FACTOR: HOW THE RISE OF WORKING WOMEN HAS CREATED A FAR 
LESS EQUAL WORLD 207 (2013).  
255. See, e.g., LASSE EIKA, MAGNA MOGSTAD, & BASIT ZAFAR, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y., 
EDUCATIONAL ASSORTATIVE MATING AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME INEQUALITY 3 (2014), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr682.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
MD5Y-T9FT]. 
256. Kerwin Kofi Charles, Erik Hurst & Alexandra Killewald, Marital Sorting and Parental 
Wealth, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 51, 52–53 (2013).  
257. Id. at 58.  
258. Id. at 59.  
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on parental wealth than on education.259 The likely reason that parental 
wealth matters more than education is that, even with uneven levels of 
education, individuals with significant parental wealth meet people from 
similar socioeconomic backgrounds in places outside universities that 
shape the marriage market;260 moreover, wealth is an attractive attribute 
in the marriage market.261 
What is important for the purpose of this Article is not the affirmation 
of one’s intuitive sense that wealth marries wealth. Rather, the studies 
about assortative mating based on parental wealth help us to understand 
why married couples are more successful in getting and retaining wealth: 
they not only get more wealth by intergenerational transfers, they also 
gain more from marriage by combining wealth from both spouses. Such 
marital trends limit wealth equalization and increase wealth 
concentration, thereby promoting greater economic disparities between 
the haves and have-nots. The data imply that encouraging more people to 
get married will not result in significant downward redistribution of 
wealth unless the patterns of selection change.262 
Sorting partners based on parental wealth is even more worrisome for 
the future. If children of the wealthy continue to select spouses based on 
parental wealth, then their children will inherit their wealth and their 
spouse’s wealth. Increased assortative mating based on wealth, therefore, 
suggests that wealth will become concentrated within an even smaller 
group of households than it currently is.263 The result will be exacerbated 
inequality of life chances, based on parental wealth. Given the law’s 
ineffectiveness in preventing or responding to wealth inequality, on the 
                                                     
259. Id. at 67.  
260. Another possible theory for the importance of parental wealth over education is that partners 
who marry later might evaluate their financial situation based on actual financial means rather than 
proxies for one’s economic situation, such as education. See Valerie K. Oppenheimer, A Theory of 
Marriage Timing, 94 AM. J. SOC. 563, 563–66 (1988).  
261. See Blossfeld & Timm, supra note 237, at 243; Christine R Schwartz, Zhen Zeng & Yu Xie, 
Marrying Up by Marrying Down: Status Exchange Between Social Origin and Education in the 
United States, 3 SOC. SCI. 1003 (2016) (finding support for the thesis that people with higher 
education backgrounds and lower socioeconomic backgrounds tend to marry those with lower 
education backgrounds from more privileged socioeconomic backgrounds). 
262. Redistribution is defined as “[t]he act or process of distributing something again or anew.” 
Redistribution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This Article adopts a broader meaning, 
expanding on Nancy Fraser’s definition, which follows:  
The remedy for economic injustice is political-economic restructuring of some sort. This might 
involve redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labour, subjecting investment to 
democratic decision-making, or transforming other basic economic structures. Although these 
various remedies differ importantly from one another, I shall henceforth refer to the whole group 
of them by the generic term redistribution.  
Fraser, supra note 20, at 73. 
263. See MARINA ADSHADE, DIRTY MONEY: THE ECONOMICS OF SEX AND LOVE 99 (2013).  
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one hand, and positive assortative mating trends, on the other, marriage 
among wealthy couples is likely to lead to greater wealth concentration. 
2. State’s Support of Positive Assortative Mating 
What is the law’s role in these class-based selection patterns? It seems, 
prima facie, to have no role, as people’s selection of partners is a product 
of multiple highly individualized and personal preferences. However, as 
the Article shows below, social policy plays a role in buttressing 
homogenous marriage patterns, as people’s ability to meet in certain 
venues increases their chances to select partners from different 
backgrounds. And vice versa: people’s limited ability to meet individuals 
from other socioeconomic backgrounds (in settings where intimate 
partners meet) decreases their chances for cross-class relationships. To get 
an account of how people sort their partners and how the organization of 
social spaces impacts the selection patterns, one needs to understand the 
mechanisms of individuals’ attractions. 
The main question that scholars debate is whether selection is affected 
by exposure to diverse populations and opportunities to meet others, or by 
innate personal preferences that are hard to modify. In sociology, these 
two possible options derive from “the supply-side perspective,” which 
argues that the networks and social contexts in which people participate 
make up the pool from which they select their mates.264 In other words, 
according to this viewpoint, “assortative mating is fostered by assortative 
meeting.”265 “Demand-side theories,” conversely, emphasize personal 
decisions and preferences in selecting mates.266 If demand-side theories 
fully explain the phenomenon under discussion, then social policies that 
enable economic segregation or integration have little or nothing to do 
with mating selection. But if these are not mutually exclusive theories, 
then part of the reason that people marry individuals from similar 
socioeconomic backgrounds is of our own design. 
The sociological research in the area suggests that exposure to a pool 
of people from different backgrounds matters for assortative mating. In a 
2013 study, professors Michèle Belot and Marco Francesconi considered 
whether assortative mating primarily reflects an intrinsic personal 
preference or, rather, people’s greater access to peers from their own 
                                                     
264. Matthijs Kalmijn & Henk Flap, Assortative Meeting and Mating: Unintended Consequences 
of Organized Settings for Partner Choices, 79 SOC. FORCES 1289, 1290 (2001). 
265. Id. at 1309.  
266. Id. at 1290.  
04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  4:13 PM 
48 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1 
 
social cohorts.267 To examine the issue, the researchers studied 1,800 male 
and 1,800 female speed-daters from eighty-four speed-dating events.268 
During these events, each participant would attend roughly twenty-two 
“dates” lasting three minutes each; at the end of the night, each participant 
would submit a form to the agency, listing the names of the partners they 
want to see again.269 The speed-dating environment was designed to 
reduce the issue of disproportionate access to similarly situated 
individuals to see whether assortative mating still appeared when meeting 
opportunities were broadened beyond a person’s ordinary social circle. 
The study concluded that innate personal preferences and meeting 
opportunities are both responsible for assortative mating.270 First, the 
researchers observed that even when given equal opportunities to meet 
diverse types of people the speed-daters tended to gravitate toward others 
of similar age, height, and education level.271 Second, the researchers 
observed that, regardless of each dater’s personal attributes, some traits 
seemed universally to be more desirable than others. For both genders, 
younger partners were most frequently “proposed to” via the matching 
service at the end of the events. Women preferred nonsmoking males, 
while men preferred women with higher education.272 Although the 
foregoing traits were generally desired, the composition of each speed-
dating group influenced their relative popularity. The researchers noticed 
a direct correlation between the prevalence of a trait and its desirability. 
For example, when there were only a handful of women with higher 
education at an event, these women tended to receive fewer proposals than 
did higher-educated women at an event teeming with such women.273 
Thus, the effect of innate preferences on assortative mating may be 
compounded by the greater number of similarly situated individuals in a 
person’s circle. 
This finding does not support the intuitive assumption that people’s 
innate desire to meet a similar mate drives them to seek social circles with 
more similarly situated people, for the speed-daters in the study did not 
have any say in the composition of the dating groups they joined. Rather, 
the simple fact that similarly situated people tend to predominate in a 
                                                     
267. Michèle Belot & Marco Francesconi, Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate 
Choice Decisions, 48 J. HUM. RES. 475, 475–77 (2013).  
268. Id. at 480.  
269. Id. at 479–80. 
270. Id. at 477.  
271. Id.  
272. Id. at 497.  
273. Id. 
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person’s social circle increases the prevalence-based desirability of those 
traits. This, in combination with people’s innate attraction to similarly 
situated partners, reinforces assortative mating. 
Another recent study examined whether having greater racial diversity 
in a classroom’s cohort affects the probability that interracial intimate 
relationships will be formed. The study found that, on average for 
nonblack students, having 2% more black students than in the average 
cohort increases the chances of those students having future intimate 
relationships with black students by 0.6%.274 
Beyond the availability of diverse potential partners, some spheres are 
of particular importance to marriage markets and to assortative mating. 
Dutch researchers used data from married and cohabiting couples in the 
Netherlands to examine whether couples who met through common social 
settings (work, school, neighborhood, family connections, or community 
organizations) were more likely to align in terms of each partner’s age, 
education, religion, class upbringing, and present socioeconomic status 
than couples who did not meet through these venues.275 The researchers 
found that 42% of the couples met through at least one of the five 
organized social settings, with school and family connections accounting 
for the greatest proportion of meeting opportunities.276 Partners who met 
at the same school had a higher incidence of aligning along most of the 
attribute metrics.277 Partners who met at the same workplace were more 
likely to belong to the same socioeconomic class at the time that they met. 
However, the homogenizing effects of the other social settings, while 
extant, were not as strong.278 Further, the results revealed that the couples 
who met at random or through mutual friends, rather than through one of 
the five organized settings, also tended to align in terms of their personal 
attributes. The study thus suggests that, while meeting opportunities 
certainly play a significant role, “preferences remain an important source 
of homogamy in partner choice.”279 
The bottom line of these studies is that both personal preferences and 
meeting pools, especially in particular settings, make a difference in 
regard to intimate selection. This means that increasing meetings among 
                                                     
274. Luca Paolo Merlino, Max Friedrich Steinhardt & Liam Wren-Lewis, More Than Just Friends? 
School Peers and Adult Interracial Relationships 3 (July 23, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2999043 [https://perma.cc/SD5N-ZJ4C].  
275. Kalmijn & Flap, supra note 256, at 1289.  
276. Id. at 1297–98. 
277. Id. at 1289. 
278. Id. at 1309. 
279. Id. 
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people from different backgrounds can result in an upturn of cross-cultural 
relationships. At the same time, fewer opportunities for people from 
different socioeconomic backgrounds to meet may be another explanation 
for the growing trend of socioeconomic-based selection. 
But current policies drive toward further socioeconomic separation and 
a decrease in cross-class relationships. Irrefutably, today the United States 
features growing socioeconomic segregation and fewer opportunities for 
encounters between people from different economic strata.280 In the past 
three decades, residential segregation by income has increased. According 
to data by the Pew Research Center, 28% of lower-income households in 
2010 were located in a majority lower-income census tract, up from 23% 
in 1980.281 At the same time, 18% of upper-income households were 
located in a majority upper-income census tract, up from 9% in 1980. The 
law’s role here is beyond mere inaction. As Richard Reeves explains, 
“This inverse ghettoization is a product of a complex web of local rules 
and regulations regarding the use of land. The rise of ‘exclusionary 
zoning,’ designed to protect the home values, schools, and neighborhoods 
of the affluent, has badly distorted the American property market.”282 
Moreover, “[z]oning ordinances . . . have become important mechanisms 
for incorporating class divisions into urban physical geographies.”283 
This growing residential ghettoization is mirrored in school segregation 
patterns. Indeed, “[e]conomic sorting at the neighborhood level leads to 
social sorting in terms of schools, churches, and community groups. This 
means fewer interactions and social ties across social classes.”284 Data 
consistently show that from the 1970s to 2010, school populations became 
more homogenous socioeconomically.285 According to a 2016 study, in 
                                                     
280. See Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs? Toward a Political Economy of 
Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1553 (2006) (“This concern with family life as the 
creation and protection of private space, when played out in a legal environment that permits affluent 
localities to separate themselves from the concerns of poor localities, has meant the erosion of any 
sense of ‘linked fate’ between rich and poor, black and white.”).  
281. Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Residential Segregation by Income, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/01/the-rise-of-residential-segregation-by-
income/#fn-14312-1 [https://perma.cc/LB4E-VPAT]. 
282. REEVES, supra note 32, at 102.  
283. Id. at 103.  
284. Id. at 106.  
285. See, e.g., Sean Corcoran & William N. Evans, Income Inequality, The Median Voter, and the 
Support for Public Education 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16097, 2010), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16097.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD9M-YAZN] (“[M]ost U.S. school 
districts experienced growth in income inequality between 1970 and 2000.”); Ann Owens, Sean F. 
Reardon & Christopher Jencks, Trends in School Economic Segregation, 1970 to 2010, 22 (Stanford 
Ctr. for Educ. Policy Analysis Working Paper, 2014), https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/ 
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the public-school system, between-district differences in income 
segregation increased by over 15% from 1990 to 2010.286 
The cost of higher education serves as another barrier for meeting 
people from different economic strata.287 Numerous studies indicate that 
education is one of the most significant sources of assortative mating, 
because attending college provides an opportunity to meet potential 
spouses and because people tend to self-select partners with a similar 
education level.288 Further, as couples get married at older ages, the 
likelihood of finding a partner in educational institutions increases.289 The 
rising cost of college tuition serves as a barrier to pursue higher education 
and likely increases incidents of homogenous marriage. College tuition 
has escalated twelve-fold since 1978, far surpassing the inflation rate.290 
Although some lower-income students have opted to incur more debt,291 
others have been unable to attend college due to the hefty price tag.292 
                                                     
files/owens%20reardon%20jencks%20school%20income%20segregation%20july2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MSU7-XGJ2] (“Economic segregation between schools and school districts has 
increased over the past several decades.”). 
286. Ann Owens, Sean F. Reardon & Christopher Jencks, Income Segregation Between Schools 
and School Districts, 53 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 1159, 1159 (2016). 
287. Beyond the price of higher education, there are other significant advantages to wealthier 
people in college admissions, from the college admission process to a preferential advantage if their 
parents graduated from the same college. See REEVES, supra note 32, at 107–09.  
288. Belot and Francesconi’s study of speed-daters attests to the important role that meeting 
opportunities play in fueling assortative mating. See supra note 267. In 2013, Facebook analyzed its 
users’ data to determine that 28% of married couples attended the same college. Cara Newton, College 
Students Still Often Find Spouses on Campus (Oct. 17, 2013, 7:50 AM), http://www. 
usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/15/college-marriage-facebook/2989039/ 
[https://perma.cc/QDB9-CXZ5]. Although not all these couples met at their respective colleges, as 
partners may have attended at different times or attended at the same time but never crossed paths, 
Facebook’s finding still supports the notion that people tend to gravitate toward partners with a similar 
educational level.  
289. Robert D. Mare, Five Decades of Educational Assortative Mating, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 15, 15 
(1991).  
290. Michelle Jamrisko & Ilan Kolet, Cost of College Degree in U.S. Soars 12 Fold: Chart of the 
Day, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-
15/cost-of-college-degree-in-u-s-soars-12-fold-chart-of-the-day [https://perma.cc/MW9Y-DY82]. 
291. Total outstanding student debt has quadrupled since 2003, surpassing all other forms of debt, 
including credit card debt. Ann Marie Weirsch, The Cost of College: Student Loan Debt on the Rise, 
5 FOREFRONT 1, 10 (2014), https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/ 
forefront/ff-v5n01/ff-v5n014501-the-cost-of-college-student-loan-debt.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/8HYG-ZNWK]. 
292. Up to 40% of low-income students who are accepted to college do not end up matriculating 
because “[t]hey’re stymied by tuition sticker shock, Kafkaesque paperwork requirements and a quiet, 
corrosive feeling that they don’t belong.” Meredith Kolodner, Why Are Low-Income Students Not 
Showing Up to College, Even Though They Have Been Accepted?, HECHINGER REP. (Aug. 14, 2015), 
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A 2017 study that relied on data from 30 million students who attended 
college in the years 1999–2013 affirms that college has become a more 
homogenous place in socioeconomic terms. This study has documented 
that, among the most prestigious universities, more students come from 
families in the top 1% of income distribution (14.5%) than the bottom half 
of income distribution (13.5%).293 
For these reasons, Arnold Kling, former economist for the Federal 
Reserve System, bluntly asserts that “the value of college is in assortative 
mating.”294 Accordingly, the notion that college is a vehicle for assortative 
mating “explains rising tuition costs. If your goal as a parent is to put your 
child in a milieu of affluent children, then a school with higher tuition may 
be more attractive to you.”295 Then, as Kling suggests, the institution of 
college “explains rising inequality,” for the exorbitant tuition serves as a 
barrier for lower-income students to attend, resulting in colleges’ being 
populated predominately by students from wealthier backgrounds. This, 
in turn, encourages homogenous mating among higher-income students 
who meet at college or who meet elsewhere but are attracted to one 
another due to their shared education backgrounds.296 
In a similar context, scholars recognized that the connection between 
physical spaces, social policy, and urban design, on the one hand, and 
family lives, on the other hand, is crucial in its impact on families’ well-
being.297 These physical and economic realities make it harder for 
individuals from different classes to meet in the areas that constitute the 
main arenas for forming intimate relationships. These structures therefore 
cultivate socioeconomic inbreeding, which contributes to the marital 
wealth gap. 
In conclusion, marriage is often an instrument for wealth aggregation. 
Besides economies of scale and the behavior of married couples, a host of 
rules that prefer married couples in wealth amassment are conducive to 
the existence and growth of the marital wealth gap. Positive patterns of 
                                                     
http://hechingerreport.org/why-are-low-income-students-not-showing-up-to-college-even-though-
they-have-been-accepted/ [https://perma.cc/VA77-QGEC]. 
293. Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Nicholas Turner & Danny Yagan, Mobility 
Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 23618, 2017). 
294. Arnold Kling, Education, Assortative Mating, and Inequality, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY: 
ECONLOG (Mar. 26, 2008), http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2008/03/education_and_i_1.html 
[https://perma.cc/8UE9-T2AJ]. 
295. Id.  
296. Id. (“It explains why education is highly correlated with income . . . [for] [g]oing to college 
increases your chances of landing a high-income spouse.”). 
297. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 180–85 (showing how urban design impacts the 
creation of positive relationships among family members).  
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assortative mating also contribute to this amassment of wealth. The legal 
and social architectures that compose the primary venues in which people 
meet people from other strata are gradually becoming more 
socioeconomically segregated. The next Part considers potential 
theoretical foundations for guiding the creation of remedies to these 
problems. 
IV. A NEW THEORY OF MARRIAGE’S ROLE IN WEALTH 
INEQUALITY 
This Part introduces a few theoretical principles for narrowing the 
marital wealth gap. Two important caveats follow. First, the marital 
wealth gap is only one strand of the tangle that constitutes wealth 
inequality.298 Restructuring rules that support the marital wealth gap will 
only be one step in combating wealth inequality. Other scholars have 
offered analyses of further structural changes required to close the wealth 
gap.299 The suggestions set forth below are limited to the intersection of 
partner selection and household structure with wealth concentration. 
Second, a plan to eliminate preferential treatment of marital status—as 
related to wealth holding—entails a complicated set of considerations 
ranging from the political feasibility of such plans to the administrative 
difficulties attached to taxing families.300 Scholars have put forward 
multiple proposals addressing such issues and sketching such a detailed 
plan exceeds the scope of this Article. This Part outlines the broad 
theoretical contours of what such reforms involve but does not endorse 
any particular plan. Put differently, the Article does not aim to close the 
conversation but rather to deepen it. 
A. Sorting Approaches for Change 
So far, the Article has recognized several shortcomings concerning 
wealth inequality and family law. These shortcomings may be framed as 
follows. 
                                                     
298. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 21, at 2 (“[T]he American tax system [pertaining to families] 
is a significant cause of these problems.” (emphasis added and omitted)).  
299. See, e.g., id. at 82–90 (proposing a comprehensive plan to tax wealth); CHANG, supra note 22, 
at 117–42 (suggesting policies to combat the gender wealth gap).  
300. On the feasibility of plans to change taxation of married couples, see, e.g., Crawford, supra 
note 221, at 63; Infanti, supra note 214, at 621 (“The adoption of an individual tax filing system in 
the United States is not as politically unrealistic as other commentators believe.”). For discussion of 
the administrative problems in taxing the marital unit, see, e.g., Moore, supra note 148, at 290 
(discussing the principles of simplicity of a taxation system).  
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The system is under-inclusive: The rules governing wealth 
accumulation and retention provide benefits to married couples that are 
not available to other types of relationships, such as unmarried couples 
and nonconjugal ones.301 In section III.C, the Article details how various 
legal directives favor married couples over single people and unmarried 
couples.302 As noted earlier, while married couples benefit from tax-free 
intraspousal transfers and portability—as well as benefits in retirement 
savings and taxation of capital gains from the sale of a primary 
residence—individuals in nonmarital relationships cannot use them. 
Wealth benefits to those who already own more: In The Supportive 
State, Maxine Eichner argues that “the state would have little justification 
for funneling general economic support to those in adult-adult 
relationships, given that these adults, on average, do better financially due 
to the economies of scale of living together.”303 Not only, as Eichner 
points out, do married couples fare better financially than other families, 
but marital status also becomes more financially advantageous the richer 
the couple is.304 Marriage is increasingly the preserve of those who are 
already better off, and yet the state attaches benefits that support 
concentration of wealth within affluent married households.305 As people 
increasingly marry others who share their own socioeconomic status, the 
justifications for bestowing such benefits weaken. 
Norms of privatization encourage families to keep wealth in the family: 
As Eichner further warns, “The state’s support of family ties runs the risk 
that closer family bonds will lead to wealth being held within families and 
therefore to the increased disparities of wealth and opportunities across 
families.”306 As this Article shows in section III.C, the norms of 
privatization and rules related to inheritance and estate taxation often 
                                                     
301. Bridget J. Crawford, Valuation, Values, Norms: Proposals for Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 979, 993–94 (2016) (“Commentators also have critiqued the economic unity rationale 
for granting certain privileges to married couples, explaining that the benefit is both too broad . . . and 
too narrow . . . .”).  
302. Supra notes 149–235.  
303. EICHNER, supra note 235, at 107.  
304. Cf. Infanti, supra note 214, at 644 (“The estate and gift taxes may impose a hefty levy on such 
transfers; however, in the context of the traditional family, these taxes only apply to an exceedingly 
small slice of very wealthy transferors, who can still benefit from special rules that look to the 
existence of familial relationships when either reducing or deferring tax.”).  
305. Leong, supra note 13, at 1336 (“Marriage has become the province of the educated and 
wealthy. It has become a mechanism by which these privileged individuals perpetuate their privilege 
across generations.”). 
306. EICHNER, supra note 235, at 102. 
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motivate families, especially married households, to create more wealth 
and to keep it to themselves.307 
Legal structures that create conditions that encourage assortative 
mating: In section III.D, this Article demonstrates that increased instances 
of marriage among persons from similar stratum are another contributor 
to the marital wealth gap. 
Scholars of various fields, but mainly tax law scholars, have suggested 
various methods to address these shortcomings. In what follows, the 
Article divides their suggestions into three groups in order to assess which 
approach will solve the above-mentioned problems; it has also developed 
a fourth category, concerning the structural barriers that maintain 
assortative mating. The categories are: (1) combating the under-
inclusiveness of laws governing wealth accumulation; (2) implementing 
marriage neutrality; (3) encouraging altruism; and (4) reducing wealth-
based assortative mating. 
These categories are not mutually exclusive, in the sense that 
advocating for a particular position does not necessarily contradict 
supporting one of the other categories. In addition, because the proposals 
incorporated in each category derive from scholars in separate legal fields, 
who often work in silos, those proposals frequently address only one 
aspect related to wealth holding and the family at a time. Thus, no single 
proposal considers all aspects of wealth benefits and their connection to 
relationships together. To address such fragmentation, the Article also 
envisions additional proposals appropriate to each category. 
Combating the under-inclusiveness of laws governing wealth 
accumulation: This category includes strategies intended to reduce the 
special status of marriage by breaking down marriage’s monopoly on tax-
free wealth transfers and distribution of wealth escalators.308 This 
approach assembles proposals advocating that wealth-transfer benefits, 
granted mainly to married couples, should be extended to other types of 
families.309 Shari Motro, for instance, suggests that benefits from income 
                                                     
307. See supra notes 182–207.  
308. In a thought experiment, Bridget Crawford contemplates “an ultra-autonomous approach” to 
taxation wealth transfers, under which each individual could share the tax exemption with another 
person or persons of the individual’s choice—not necessarily a spouse. Such a regime “would allow 
each taxpayer to freely transfer his or her applicable exclusion to anyone at all, without regard to the 
existence of a marital relationship.” Crawford, supra note 294, at 995. Crawford concludes that such 
a regime would result in a revenue loss to the government, and thus “it is fiscally and politically 
unrealistic that the law would move in that direction.” Id. at 996.  
309. Cf. Theodore P. Seto, A Coasean Theory of Marriage 12 (Loyola Law Sch. Legal Studies 
Paper No. 2014–20, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424563 
[https://perma.cc/U37S-99QT] (“[T]he property and contractual aspects of the law of marriage should 
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splitting, including double estate and gift tax exclusions, should be 
restricted to married couples who are economically interdependent (i.e., 
those who pool their incomes and properties). Couples who do not 
function as one economic unit, such as couples who entered into a 
prenuptial agreement that restricts the sharing of assets between the 
couple, should not enjoy the benefits of income splitting. Simultaneously, 
laws would bestow these benefits on economically interdependent couples 
who are not married, including nonintimate couples.310 
By the same token, this approach could suggest that unmarried couples 
should use portability the same way married couples do.311 And, similarly, 
a single person should be entitled to designate someone (with whom that 
person is economically interdependent) who could exclude from the estate 
tax the unused applicable-exclusion amount of a deceased partner. 
Likewise, according to this rationale, any person who shows economic 
interdependence with another should be eligible to transfer assets without 
incurring tax consequences, regardless of marital status. This arrangement 
would likely support maintaining the exclusion for the sale of a principal 
residence, because it applies also to unmarried couples, but would insist 
that only couples (married or otherwise) who are economically 
interdependent could use it. It would also enable using the capital gains 
exclusion even if unmarried partners do not hold title as co-owners, as the 
current regulations require.312 
                                                     
be structured to maximize the legal security of welfare-enhancing exchanges and transfers between 
spouses.”).  
310. Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards A Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
1509, 1513 (2006) (“Thus, I propose that tax law consider individuals’ legally binding economic 
status independent of their marital status, and that only couples committed to sharing all taxable 
income equally should be treated as such for tax purposes.”).  
311. To clarify, I am unaware of such existing proposals—rather, I envision what the proposals 
that fall under this group would look like.  
312. The proposals in this category are incomplete in that they do not address other dimensions that 
provide preferential benefits to marital households that result in wealth concentration. For example, I 
am unaware of any suggestion regarding how to eliminate discrimination against unmarried couples 
in the retirement savings system. See generally BELLA DEPAULO, SINGLED OUT: HOW SINGLES ARE 
STEREOTYPED, STIGMATIZED, AND IGNORED, AND STILL LIVE HAPPILY EVER AFTER (2006) 
(discussing how the Social Security system discriminates against singles). However, in speculating 
about what such proposals would look like, we can conjecture that they would advocate a system in 
which family status is irrelevant—and that, rather, they would consider only the function of 
relationships. Such a system is akin to what Nancy Polikoff calls a “valuing all families” approach. 
Polikoff advocates that families be recognized by their function rather than by marriage or by any 
status. NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES 
UNDER THE LAW 125–29 (2008).  
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Toward marriage neutrality: Under this approach I categorize 
proposals that advocate marriage neutrality.313 These proposals reflect the 
principle that marital status should not be a factor that contributes to 
wealth amassing. They advocate decoupling marriage from some wealth 
benefits, or reducing the preferential status of marriage. The outcome of 
this approach is to reduce wealth consolidation among married couples. 
Much of the focus in this group of proposals is on changing distortion in 
the system of income tax (the advantages of joint taxation to some married 
couples), which is outside the scope of this Article.314 Some scholarship 
more relevant to our purpose, however, explicitly tackles the wealth 
benefits attendant to marriage.315 
Bridget Crawford suggests eliminating the marital deduction to make 
gratuitous wealth transfers between spouses fully taxable.316 The result, 
she argues, is increased tax revenues and reduced administrative costs 
related to the collection of estate and gift taxes. She contends that such a 
plan is generally more consistent with an approach that treats all types of 
relationships equally. Anthony Infanti presents a comprehensive plan to 
switch the United States tax system from joint filing to single filing, which 
“decentralizes” the special benefits that the traditional family structure 
receives under the current system.317 Building, in part, on the model of the 
Canadian tax system, Infanti offers a scheme of individual filing that treats 
all economically interdependent relationships equally. When it comes to 
taxation of wealth transfer among partners, like Crawford, he suggests 
repealing the estate and gift tax marital deductions.318 
                                                     
313. Cf. Yair Listokin, Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal, 67 TAX L. REV. 185, 185 (2014) 
(“Proponents of marriage neutrality, by contrast, contest the notion that married couples are a single 
unit and abhor the marriage penalties and marriage bonuses that follow from a progressive income 
tax with couples equity.”).  
314. Several tax law scholars have criticized the joint filing aspects of tax in the United States and 
suggested a move to an individual filing system, including in the system of wealth transfers. See, e.g., 
Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS 
L.J. 651, 683–84 (2010); Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work: Aid for Affluent Husband 
Care, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 109, 198 (2011) (arguing that joint filing provides unfair benefits 
to married couples and advocating shifting to an individual filing system).  
315. For other relevant proposals, see Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the Qtip Trust 
and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV 1729, 1748 (1998) (“For estate tax purposes, 
the unlimited marital deduction should be replaced by an estate-equalization limitation.”); James M. 
Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 
U. CIN. L REV. 1409, 1434 (2010) (“The joint return (and special rates for married taxpayers) should 
be abolished as an incoherent penalty and subsidy of marriage. Joint filing is indefensible as a 
component of a progressive tax system.”).  
316. Crawford, supra note 196, at 797–805.  
317. Infanti, supra note 214, at 67.  
318. Id. at 656. 
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Although combating the inclusiveness aspect (proposed by Motro) and 
advocating for marriage neutrality (espoused by Crawford and Infanti) 
advance similar goals—that is, recognizing relationships other than 
marriage—they use different strategies. Motro’s approach would 
maintain a system of income splitting but would be more selective in 
terms of who gets to use it. Crawford and Infanti, on the other hand, 
suggest fighting non-inclusiveness by dismantling the structural problem, 
by switching to a system of individual filing, or by repealing the marital 
deduction. 
Similarly, Lily Kahng explores the evolution of tax rules for capital 
gains on the sale of one’s primary residence and the rules’ impact on 
different taxpayers. She finds that “these subsidies for home sales 
rest upon questionable policy justifications, flawed logical reasoning, and 
poor design choices.”319 She thus suggests repealing the capital gains 
exclusion on a principal residence and treating gains on home sales in the 
same manner as all other types of capital gains.320 While this proposal 
does not address marriage neutrality explicitly, the repeal of the special 
treatment for taxation of gains from the sale of residences also means the 
cancellation of the double exclusion for married couples. 
Encouraging altruism: The third group of proposals is advanced by 
scholars who worry that norms of close family connections incentivize 
family members to keep wealth within the family. Consequently, these 
proposals suggest that the state should create mechanisms for 
incentivizing transfers of wealth outside the family. For instance, Eichner 
suggests that the state should encourage wealth transfer outside affluent 
families, such as tax incentives for charitable giving.321 Mark L. Ascher 
argues that the state should adopt a deduction for donations to charities as 
a means to encourage philanthropy. In his words, “Given the incentives 
for lifetime giving that reallocation at death would create, the allowance 
of a gift tax charitable deduction would surely result in a marked increase 
in lifetime charitable giving.”322 
In fact, such incentives already exist: the tax code allows, in certain 
circumstances, the deduction of charitable contributions from income 
                                                     
319. Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, supra note 83, at 189.  
320. Id. at 236–37.  
321. EICHNER, supra note 235, at 108. In a similar vein, Bill Gates recently noted, “Philanthropy 
also can be an important part of the solution set. It’s too bad that Piketty devotes so little space to 
it . . . . Philanthropy done well not only produces direct benefits for society, it also reduces dynastic 
wealth.” See Bill Gates, Why Inequality Matters, GATES NOTES (Oct. 13, 2014), 
https://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Why-Inequality-Matters-Capital-in-21st-Century-Review 
[https://perma.cc/F988-H2PG]. 
322. Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 98–99 (1990). 
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tax.323 And there is also an estate tax charitable deduction, allowing a free 
transfer to charities from estates.324 
Reducing wealth-based assortative mating: This category incorporates 
the author’s own thought experiment, with two rationales. First, if 
marriage is a concentrator of wealth, it can also serve as a wealth 
redistributor in the same way that socially conservative scholars advocate 
promoting marriage as a means to reduce poverty.325 It is not a new idea 
that marriage can help redistribute wealth downward by breaking up the 
concentration of wealth and creating opportunities for upward 
socioeconomic mobility. For instance, as early as the end of the fourth 
century, the Catholic Church began to prohibit marriage between 
cousins.326 The reasons for the prohibition are complex, but one 
hypothesis is that the Church aimed to break “the continuity of European 
family estates and maneuver[] property into the church.”327 In this early 
example, lawmakers regulated marriage and relationships in a way that 
transferred wealth from a few families to others, including to the Church 
itself, thus preventing wealth from remaining in the family. In the United 
States, the prohibition against cousin marriage emerged in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. While much of the reasoning and debate about 
banning first-cousin marriage focused on eugenic arguments, 
anthropologists suggest that the ban also sprang from the desire to have 
immigrants assimilate (by marrying outside their groups), as well as from 
a reaction against the elite’s consolidation of wealth through 
consanguineous marriages.328 
                                                     
323. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 2055(a), 2522(a) (2012). 
324. Id. §§ 2501–2524. 
325. The notion that an increase in marriage rates can substitute for legal measures to promote 
income equalization has loomed large among socially conservative commentators. In a 2015 report 
titled Strong Families, Prosperous States, W. Bradford Wilcox, Joseph Price, and Robert Lerman 
argue that “[h]igher levels of marriage, and especially higher levels of married-parent families, are 
strongly associated with more economic growth, more economic mobility, less child poverty, and 
higher median family income at the state level in the United States.” WILCOX, PRICE & LERMAN, 
supra note 108, at 3. As Senator Marco Rubio put it, marriage is “the greatest tool to lift children and 
families from poverty.” Annie Lowery, Can Marriage Cure Poverty?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 4, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/magazine/can-marriage-cure-poverty.html?_r=0 [https 
://perma.cc/JJW4-P4C2]. Brad Wilcox and Bob Lerman thus suggest that, to overcome economic 
inequality, the state should take measures to increase marriage rates. Wilcox & Lerman, supra note 
16. Such measures include launching a national campaign to encourage marriage and eliminate 
marriage penalties. Id. 
326. MARTIN OTTENHEIMER, FORBIDDEN RELATIVES: THE AMERICAN MYTH OF COUSIN 
MARRIAGE 63 (1996).  
327. Id. at 68.  
328. Id. at 152–53.  
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Second, the state can try to eliminate the schemas that stand in the way 
of cross-class meetings, since, as stated before, assortative mating is at 
least partly a result of assortative meeting. Of course, beyond its interest 
in increasing instances of meetings between people from different 
socioeconomic strata, the state has many other excellent reasons to fight 
these trends of segregation.329 
The next section evaluates which of the above approaches would help 
design a family law paradigm that mitigates the concentration of wealth 
among married couples. 
B. Transformative Redistribution and Recognition as a Paradigm 
This section provides a theoretical basis to assess which of the 
mentioned approaches would resolve the problems identified above. This 
Article achieves this by uncovering the proposals’ normative 
implications, focusing on the harms they would fix. To this end, it relies 
on the analytical categories that critical theorist Nancy Fraser presents in 
her work on claims for “recognition” versus “redistribution” and on 
“affirmative” versus “transformative” remedies. 
In a number of articles and books, Fraser puts forth a theory of social 
justice that serves as a normative baseline for the question of which 
struggles for justice are equitable.330 Her intervention is in parsing the 
differences between claims aiming to fight cultural misrecognition 
(demand for recognition of differences, typically “under the banners of 
nationality, ethnicity, ‘race’, gender, and sexuality”) versus claims to fight 
socioeconomic injustice.331 Claims for redistribution are grounded in 
efforts to abolish the class differences that arise from an unjust political 
economy. Conversely, cultural recognition struggles can either advocate 
for the celebration of differences or for the deconstruction of 
differences.332 Fraser contends that contemporary politics have often 
focused on eliminating cultural misrecognition, to the neglect of claims 
about maldistribution of resources.333 The rise of the politics of 
recognition, Fraser observes, has eclipsed the previously dominant 
                                                     
329. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Why Economic School Segregation Matters, NYU FURMAN 
CTR. (Mar. 2014), http://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/why-economic-school-segregation-
matters [https://perma.cc/VFC9-9ACD]. 
330. See, e.g., NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE: REIMAGINING POLITICAL SPACE IN A 
GLOBALIZING WORLD (2009).  
331. See Fraser, supra note 20, at 68. 
332. FRASER, supra note 330, at 18, 49–51.  
333. See Fraser, supra note 20, at 68, 70–74 (“[G]roup identity supplants class interest as the chief 
medium of political mobilization.”). 
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politics of redistribution, which sought to remedy socioeconomic 
injustices through the fair distribution of resources.334 
In addition, Fraser makes a useful distinction between the types of 
remedies that individuals and groups have advocated as a means to fix 
these dual prongs of injustice. Accordingly, she distinguishes between 
affirmative strategies and transformative strategies, where affirmative 
strategies are “remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of 
social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that 
generates them,”335 and transformative remedies “mean remedies aimed 
at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the 
underlying generative framework.”336 Transformative remedies are those 
that remake the legal structure and dismantle the architecture that embeds 
the harm. Strategies of affirmative recognition, in contrast, are more 
focused on fixing the current problem; they bandage an injury without 
addressing the source of the injury itself. Fraser’s central claim is that 
transformative remedies to redress misrecognition do not contradict 
transformative remedies to redress economic injustice. The contrary is 
true: the combination of transformative recognition and redistribution 
constitute “folk paradigms of justice”—linked elements that (should) 
inform struggles for social justice.337 
These paradigms are valuable in evaluating the categories discussed 
above. In the case of family law and wealth inequality, the misrecognition 
(cultural) aspect stems from the special status given to marriage 
simultaneously with privation of recognition of other relationships. The 
distributional aspect is the overconcentration of wealth in married 
households in the top 10%, including the top 1%, and particularly the 
effect of diverse legal directives and norms on such concentration. 
Categorizing the approaches for solving the problem under the categories 
of “recognition and redistribution” and of “affirmative versus 
transformative” provides an analytical tool for assessing which proposals 
fix only one paradigm and which can address both. Table 3, below, shows 
the classifications.338 
 
                                                     
334. See id.  
335. Id. at 82. 
336. Id.  
337. NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A POLITICAL-
PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 11 (Joel Golb et al. trans., 2003) (“[I]n their political reference. . . . the 
terms ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ refer not to philosophical paradigms but rather to folk 
paradigms of justice, which inform present-day struggles in civil society.”). 
338. Cf. Fraser, supra note 20, at 87. 
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Table 3: 
Analytical Paradigms 
 Affirmative Transformative 
Redistribution Encouraging 
altruism  
Reducing wealth-
based assortative 
mating  
Recognition Combating under-
inclusiveness  
Marriage 
neutrality 
 
Combating under-inclusiveness is an approach most apposite to the 
category of “affirmative recognition.” This approach, which aspires to 
solve the problem of the preferential treatment of married couples and the 
misrecognition of other select groups of couples, is fundamentally 
grounded in recognition of other types of families. The problem with such 
an approach is that, although it formally equalizes treatments for different 
types of relationships, it still contributes to the amassing of wealth in the 
hands of a few better-off individuals, ignoring the larger socioeconomic 
maldistribution. That is, even if a larger portion of the population can use 
wealth benefits and escalators, there still exists the problem of the 
concentration of wealth among a small number of affluent families. 
Eventually, even if singles and unmarried couples become entitled to 
transfer more wealth among themselves—in the same way as married 
couples can—they will likely transfer it to people who are from relatively 
similar economic strata (e.g., their children, friends, or siblings). In fact, 
studies show that nonmarried couples also tend to pair with people from 
similar socioeconomic and educational backgrounds.339 The outcome is 
that recognition of more family types for purposes of wealth benefits does 
not solve the problem of concentration. It simply allows additional 
wealthy individuals to enjoy the legal structures that permit wealth 
retention within the family, albeit more diverse types of families. 
Moreover, the types of estate and gift tax benefits available to married 
couples already apply to those who, jointly, have more than $11 million 
in their estate. Data show that the median net worth of people sixty-five 
                                                     
339. See, e.g., Debra L. Blackwell & Daniel T. Lichter, Homogamy Among Dating, Cohabiting, 
and Married Couples, 45 SOC. Q. 719, 732 (2004) (concluding that, overall, “the rather stringent 
sorting criteria that men and women use in selecting a marital partner, which manifests itself in marital 
homogamy, is also used in dating and cohabiting relationships”); Christine R. Schwartz, Trends and 
Variation in Assortative Mating: Causes and Consequences, 39 ANN. REV. SOC. 451, 459 (2013) 
(“These findings suggest that increases in cohabitation have not substantially altered trends in 
assortative mating, at least in the United States.”).  
04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  4:13 PM 
2018] THE MARITAL WEALTH GAP 63 
 
years and older in the fifth quintile of wealth in the United States in 2011 
(which represents the top 10% of United States residents) was 
$899,608.340 In 2013, only 10,568 decedents filed federal estate tax 
returns.341 This means that equalizing the tax benefits of marriage to other 
households will only assist a small percentage of unmarried individuals 
who are very wealthy. 
Even if we fix other inequalities, such as the preferential treatment of 
married couples in retirement plans, by extending the benefits to singles 
and unmarried couples, we still do not solve the fundamental structural 
inequality: family support as a pillar of privatization. One structural 
problem with retirement saving is what political scientist Philipp Rehm 
calls the “privatization of social policy risks.”342 Rehm points out that, in 
most rich democracies, there has been a shift from a system of defined-
benefit pension plans to a system based mainly on defined-contribution 
plans (such as 401(k)s and IRAs). And the more that the latter become 
popular, the more they become necessary to maintain a reasonable 
standard of living after retirement.343 This shift, Rehm argues, “stealthily 
contributes to wealth inequality” because defined-contribution plans are 
savings that are transferred to the next generation upon death of the 
beneficiary (unlike traditional pensions that expire with the death of the 
recipient).344 The outcome is that more wealth is being transferred to the 
next generation. In his words:  
[I]f one wants to retire comfortably, one accidentally will make 
one’s offspring rich in the process. The inherited wealth may well 
be significant enough for the offspring to pay itself a private and 
fairly generous monthly stipend (“private basic income”) to 
sustain a middleclass level of living, without participating in the 
labor market.345 
So, while incentivizing more people to save for retirement and ending 
discrimination against singles are important goals, the result may again be 
the transfer of more wealth to the next generation without fixing the 
underlying cause of wealth inequality. 
                                                     
340. Vornovitsky et al., supra note 73 at 1, 7 tbl.A1.  
341. SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics Filing Year Table 1, supra note 98 (click link to table for 
2013).  
342. PHILIPP REHM, RISK INEQUALITY AND WELFARE STATES: SOCIAL POLICY PREFERENCES, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND DYNAMICS 201 (2016).  
343. Id. at 211.  
344. Id. at 210–11. 
345. Id. 
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Solving the inclusiveness aspect does not change the systematic 
problem that relationship status confers benefits on wealthy couples and 
entrenches norms of privatization of support. In fact, it can result in an 
expanded group of people who use tax exemptions and benefits, and 
thereby reduce state revenue. As Patricia Cain points out in a similar 
context, “Thus, to extend a flawed provision to unmarried couples might 
create formal equality; but it would not further substantive justice.”346 
Encouraging altruism advances a redistributive goal, but it is not 
transformative. It remedies economic injustice because it creates 
incentives to redistribute outside the family. There are several questions 
about how efficient such mechanisms are in reducing wealth amassment. 
Critiques abound concerning the current system of encouraging charitable 
contributions.347 In short, scholars argue that this tax deduction provides 
more subsidies to wealthier individuals than to the poor, who can give 
only a smaller proportion of their wealth away, and that individuals can 
contribute to purposes that do not serve the public interest (e.g., golf clubs 
or foundations that their offspring control).348 These critiques, as well as 
the various suggestions on how to solve this problem, are beyond the 
scope of this Article. For our purpose, suffice it to note that the current 
system is problematic because it does not result in breaking up 
concentration of wealth. Indeed, a recent report indicates that mechanisms 
to encourage altruism yield limited success. A 2014 Family Wealth 
Transfers Report from researchers at Wealth-X shows that members of 
United States families with ultra-high net worth are expected to pass on 
$6 trillion at death over the next three decades.349 But only $170 billion of 
these fortunes––or about .028%—are estimated to be philanthropic 
bequests.350 
Finally, this approach is not transformative because it does not prevent 
the overconcentration to begin with. Even assuming that encouraging 
people to give away some of their wealth is effective, this still does not 
combat the fundamental moral and societal problems of wide gaps in 
wealth holding. A truly transformative approach should tackle the 
concentration via marriage, not just find ways to redistribute it after it is 
                                                     
346. Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 677, 702 
(2000). 
347. See Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155, 169–70 (2014) (surveying 
the different critiques on encouraging charitable contributions).  
348. Id. at 169–71.  
349. WEALTH-X, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSFERS REPORT 26 (2014), http://www.wealthx.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/WealthX_NFP_FamilyWealthTransfersReport-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y8FZ-FBQW]. 
350. Id. at 30.  
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amassed. Moreover, a system that relies on encouraging altruism does not 
remedy the structural problems embedded in the distribution of wealth 
because it does not address the other pillars of privatization that signal 
married couples to keep wealth in the family. 
Marriage neutrality advances transformative recognition of families, 
and, to a lesser extent, promotes redistributive ends. This approach aims 
to decouple some of the wealth benefits attendant to marital status and to 
reduce the preferential treatment of married couples. The basic rationale 
is that married couples already do better in terms of wealth accumulation, 
so there is no reason for the state to bestow further benefits on them. 
Rather than extending existing benefits to others, the state should—when 
fair—treat relationships neutrally, regardless of status. This arrangement 
is grounded in a cultural recognition claim because its other purpose is to 
promote various, nontraditional families. It fights misrecognition because 
it does not single out marriage for special treatment. Rather, it looks 
functionally for those relationships that create interdependency and, thus, 
should be entitled to legal recognition. In this way, all relationships are 
evaluated by their function and not by their status. This approach is also 
redistributive because, eventually, it will curtail some of the wealth 
aggregation by married households. That is, these proposals strive to 
transfer more revenue to the state—which should, at least in theory, use it 
to provide more benefits to society. 
Finally, this approach is transformative because it deals with the roots 
of the problem, “restructuring the underlying generative framework,” 
rather than promoting a change that leaves the current structure as is.351 
For instance, Khang’s proposal to repeal the exclusion of capital gains 
from the sale of a primary residence and treat it as any other capital gains 
is transformative because, as she shows, this exclusion is not an effective 
way to encourage homeownership.352 This proposal does not advocate 
allowing more couples to enjoy it. It suggests an approach that recognizes 
all families and individuals and, at the same time, fixes a problem of 
political economy. More generally, changing the architecture requires, for 
our purpose, plans that end the preferential treatment of marriage, 
effectively tax the transfer of great wealth within families, and fix the 
infrastructures that cause some families to be unable to save.353 
                                                     
351. Cf. Fraser, supra note 20, at 82.  
352. Khang, supra note 83, at 237 (“Moreover, based on our recent experience with the housing 
market and its particularly adverse impacts on minority homeowners and communities, we must 
reevaluate how the government can more effectively promote equality and prosperity.”).  
353. Other possible reforms include, in the area of retirement savings, not only ending the 
preferential treatment of married couples but also acknowledging that some individuals encounter 
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Reducing wealth-based assortative mating has elements of cultural and 
redistributive paradigms and can be transformative or affirmative. In its 
thin version, the state will try to encourage marriage between people from 
different socioeconomic backgrounds. The thin version is not only 
ineffective but also affirmative (not transformative). Theoretically, to 
fight the concentration of wealth through marriage the state can use 
legislation. Just as certain relatives are banned from marrying each other, 
the state could, hypothetically, ban people with a certain high level of 
wealth from marrying their counterparts.354 The state, to be sure, cannot 
and should not adopt such a ban because it infringes on individual liberty 
and autonomy in a way that contradicts fundamental principles of a liberal 
state.355 A softer version of lawmaking that could potentially reduce 
marriage rates between wealthy families is to give tax benefits for 
individuals who marry into very different economic ranks.356 But such 
regulation, while it may encourage a socially good purpose, would also 
infringe too much on personal autonomy.357 Suggesting that the state 
needs to pay rich people in order to marry those who are less well off, or 
to pay poor people to marry richer people, would stigmatize the rich and 
                                                     
structural impediments in saving for retirement. See, e.g., Advisory Council Report on Disparities for 
Women and Minorities in Retirement Savings, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2010), https://www.dol.gov/ 
agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/disparities-for-women-and-minorities-in-
retirement-savings [https://perma.cc/CDP4-5CWG] (reporting that women and workers of ethnic 
minorities, in both the public and private sectors, struggle to save ample retirement funds). One 
problem is that women who decrease their participation in the labor force when giving birth and 
serving as the primary caregiver generally have a harder time saving for retirement. Chang, supra 
note 37, at 65–68. Because retirement plans depend on the years the beneficiary had in the paid 
workforce, that person’s earnings, and whether that person worked full time, women are often thrown 
off one of the main wealth escalators (retirement savings). A transformative remedy will not aim to 
repair this problem by increasing eligibility based on the other partner’s savings. There are several 
suggestions for rectifying this problem using structure-based changes. Id. at 125–39. 
354. As a thought experiment, contemplating a list of measures that the state should not adopt in 
trying to discourage intimate discrimination in the contexts of race or disability, Elizabeth Emens 
suggests the state can create a regime in which only mixed race or mixed disability marriages were 
allowed. This is, as Emens clarifies, absurd and “[n]obody, of course, would actually advocate a law 
that so patently impinges on individual liberty and autonomy.” Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate 
Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1382–
83 (2009). 
355. Cf. id.; EICHNER, supra note 227, at 104 (“Liberalism’s great respect for individual autonomy 
requires that the state give individuals the freedom to engage or not engage in consensual relationships 
with others as they choose.”).  
356. Here also this Article builds on Emens’s list of things the state should not do in order to 
encourage marriages between people of mixed races or when one spouse has a disability. Emens, 
supra note 344, at 1385–36.  
357. Cf. id. at 1356 (“To impinge on people’s individual preferences in the intimate domain would 
seem a gross imposition on personal autonomy, in the absence of a substantial showing of 
countervailing harm.”).  
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the poor.358 In any event, it is doubtful how effective such tax incentives 
would be. 
In a more reasonable version of this approach, because marriage 
selection is a source of enduring wealth inequality, the state could be 
justified in creating conditions for further social integration that might 
result in a more heterogeneous marriage market. If “[a] vigorous liberal 
democracy should be able to privilege some relationships over others for 
important public ends,”359 then it can also adopt policies that encourage 
some types of relationships over others. 
For example, because school settings, including higher education, 
constitute one of the most significant partnership markets,360 the state 
could adopt measures to diversify school attendance. Correspondingly, 
the state could take measures to decrease residential economic-based 
segregation. Proposals for how it could do these things—increase school 
heterogeneity, decrease higher education costs to increase heterogeneity, 
and reduce the number of economic-based segregated neighborhoods—
abound, and exceed the scope of this Article.361 The state has various other 
compelling reasons to fight socioeconomic segregation; contesting 
wealth-based assortative mating serves as an additional justification for 
adopting such proposals. 
This approach can be transformative or not, depending on its 
effectiveness and, more important, its aim. Even if the state takes steps to 
increase the supply side of mate selection, this will likely still yield limited 
results. Even in integrated settings, individuals are often attracted to 
people with traits similar to theirs.362 In addition, studies show that class 
sensibilities are sticky: giving people from different classes more 
opportunities to interact does not mean that they will get along, as it is 
tough to change cultural norms and intimate preferences.363 Further, 
                                                     
358. Cf. id. at 1385 (concluding that tax benefits to encourage marriage with people with disabilities 
can stigmatize people with disabilities).  
359. EICHNER, supra note 227, at 112.  
360. Kalmijn & Flap, supra note 264.  
361. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 
SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY AS AN EDUCATION REFORM STRATEGY 309–11 (2012); LeighAnn M. 
Smith, Affirmatively Further Fair Housing—and Potentially Further Fair Schooling, 24 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 329, 331 (2015) (discussing the connection between 
housing policy, economic segregation, and diversity in schools).  
362. Debra Blackwell & Daniel T. Lichter, Homogamy Among Married, Dating, and Cohabiting 
Couples, 45 SOC. Q. 719, 720–21 (2004) (“Even in culturally diverse settings, individuals often make 
themselves available for dating and ultimately for cohabitation and marriage primarily to persons with 
similar and easily observable traits (e.g., racial characteristics).”).  
363. In her study of thirty-two “different-origin” middle-class married couples consisting of one 
blue-collar-raised and one white-collar-raised spouse, Jessi Streib demonstrated that class upbringing 
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individuals increasingly meet more through virtual matchmaking apps, a 
trend that, perhaps counterintuitively, entrenches patterns of assortative 
mating.364 It may be that the degree of assortative mating in online dating 
is less than in a physical-meeting context;365 still, most studies show that 
assortative mating is persistent in online matchmaking websites.366 
Moreover, creating policies that affect mate selection in the virtual world 
is even more challenging than creating them in other arenas.367 
But the biggest weakness of fighting assortative marriage as a means 
to reduce inequality is not its level of effectiveness. Rather, while 
integration is an important cause in and of itself, it is a method that, once 
again, relies on marriage as a vehicle for change. As such, it is grounded 
in notions of privatization rather than in concrete state regulation that will 
combat the amassment of wealth. For too long, marriage has been the 
primary mechanism advocated to remedy economic inequality.368 Such a 
stratagem leaves the important problems of wealth inequality to the 
domain of private choice; it will advance some equalization of wealth but 
will not attack the structures that help maintain the marital wealth gap. 
Hence, this approach is only transformative to the extent that it is part of 
a larger project to combat socioeconomic segregation rather than as a 
primary weapon to fight economic justice via marriage. 
In conclusion, the Article does not propose a unified, detailed plan for 
transformative recognition and redistribution. Its aim is to point out that 
addressing only distributive injustice or only cultural harm will likely 
yield inequitable or inadequate results. The proposals mentioned under 
                                                     
embeds values and traits that typically endure into adulthood. This held true even when, as was the 
case for all of Streib’s couples, both partners had achieved middle-class status when they met. Streib 
calls the ingrained values and traits “sensibilities,” which encompass finance management, 
relationship to employment, leisure habits, spontaneity, parenting style, and emotional expression. 
JESSI STREIB, THE POWER OF THE PAST: UNDERSTANDING CROSS-CLASS MARRIAGES (2015).  
364. Cf., e.g., Schwartz, supra note 339, at 458 (“This suggests that matches formed through the 
internet may not differ substantially from those formed in other ways, but research on how technology 
changes the nature of marriage markets and romantic relationships is in its infancy.”).  
365. Gina Potarca, Does the Internet Affect Assortative Mating? Evidence from the U.S. and 
Germany, 61 SOC. SCI. RES. 278, 278 (2017) (“Internet promotes weaker couple endogamy compared 
to conventional contexts typically known to foster endogamy, such as school, family, friends, or 
religious venues.”).  
366. Kevin Lewis, The Limits of Racial Prejudice, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 18,814, 
18,814–19 (2013); Ken-Hou Lin and Jennifer Lundquist, Mate Selection in Cyberspace: The 
Intersection of Race, Gender, and Education, 119 AM. J. SOC. 183, 183–215 (2013). 
367. For a discussion of the challenges and possible solutions of combating structural 
discrimination in online websites, see Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic 
Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787, 2794 (2008).  
368. Murray, supra note 69, at 994 (“[M]arriage continues to ensure economic provision and 
security, relieving the state of this burden.”).  
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the categories of “toward marriage neutrality,” and possibly some 
versions of fighting socioeconomic segregation, are good steps in this 
direction. 
To clarify, this approach does not advocate eliminating all rights and 
benefits attendant to the status of being married—only those that are 
disproportionately benefiting married couples (discussed in section III.C). 
Some might be concerned that such reforms would lead to reduced rates 
of marriage. However, the wealth-enhancement benefits attendant to 
marriage do not promote marriage among the poor and working class, who 
rarely own assets, so eliminating them will not further reduce the marriage 
rate of that group of people. 
The transformative approaches are not without problems. A system that 
embeds the dual goal of transformative recognition and redistribution is 
not easy to construct and not easily politically feasible. Transformative 
remedies are harder to pursue than affirmative remedies because, by their 
nature, the former are more revolutionary. Especially in the area of 
taxation, major reforms are harder to achieve.369 Another question is what 
to do until transformative change occurs; some argue that perhaps it is 
better to seek incremental (affirmative) change that protects some people 
rather than to work for structural change that may never come.370 
These valid questions are at the center of every debate regarding social 
and legal change. This Article does not offer an answer to this 
predicament. Rather, the Article crafts a general vision that could be 
useful even in considering small changes in the law; that is, revisions to 
specific laws––not only big revolutions––should follow the offered 
paradigm. 
CONCLUSION 
In the nineteenth century, Thomas Piketty observes, “France was a 
patrimonial society characterized by a hyperconcentration of capital, in 
which inheritance and marriage played a key role and inheriting or 
marrying a large fortune could procure a level of comfort not obtainable 
through work or study.”371 In a similar fashion, marriage and 
                                                     
369. Wendy Richards, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias Perspective: It Is 
Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 611, 648 (“Usually, the tax code is 
altered in small steps, such as those taken in the recent tax reforms, but critics have persistently called 
for fundamental reform.”).  
370. Id. (“Reforms come in two flavors: small, incremental changes or fundamental, large-scale 
reforms . . . . Fundamental reform, while academically popular, is probably the most difficult to 
implement. Yet major reform is necessary to remove the marital bias in the code.”).  
371. PIKETTY, supra note 21, at 342.  
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intergenerational transfers perform a key role in maintaining and 
increasing the wealth inequality in the United States today. 
Marriage is one of the causes for such inequality—but can it also be a 
corrective? Two related processes occur simultaneously and make 
marriage a wealth concentrator. First, as a result of personal taste as well 
as socioeconomic structural separation, cross-class marriages are 
declining. Second, wealthy people are more likely than any other group to 
get married, while the poor are the least likely. These two processes 
suggest that marriage will not serve as an effective mechanism for fairer 
distribution of wealth. On the contrary, marriage among the wealthy 
exacerbates wealth inequality. And for racial minorities, who are the least 
likely to marry and to transfer wealth to the next generation, marriage will 
not remedy the wealth gap. 
Even if the state could change patterns of assortative marriage (and I 
doubt if it can in both an effective and constitutional manner), fixing 
wealth inequality through marriage is an unsound idea. For far too long, 
marriage has served as a vehicle to privatize support—shifting the 
responsibility of people’s economic survival from the state to private 
individuals. For that reason, making marriage the vehicle for upward 
mobility reiterates the same technique: the state renounces its 
responsibility to fight inequality and delegates that responsibility to the 
private choices of individuals. But this does not mean that the state should 
not try to address the architecture that encourages class-based assortative 
mating. The state has many reasons to promote socioeconomic 
integration; wealth inequality is just one of them. 
The fact that married couples fare better economically than others 
should, alone, call into question the policies that link marriage to the 
bundle of wealth escalators and consolidators. Combined with the positive 
patterns of assortative mating––where the benefits of marriage are 
distributed to those who are already well-off––these policies do not 
withstand scrutiny. 
To date, scholarship has engaged in relatively little discussion on the 
connections between family law and wealth inequality, outside the context 
of division of property at the end of marriage. No doubt, the connections 
this Article identifies here are only the tip of the iceberg. The hope is that 
this Article sparks a conversation about the role of rules pertaining to 
families in the preservation of wealth. Indeed, family law scholarship is 
changing, from a field focused primarily on marriage, children, and 
parents to one that inquires broadly into all aspects of household life. 
Boundaries of who is part of the family and which sets of laws are part of 
family law as a field are constantly challenged. Within this 
04 - Aloni.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/18/2018  4:13 PM 
2018] THE MARITAL WEALTH GAP 71 
 
transformation, wealth inequality should serve as one of the main frontiers 
of family law scholarship. 
As a point of departure for future scholarship, the framework of 
transformative recognition and redistribution is promising. It engages the 
two main harms embedded in the current system: the misrecognition of 
diverse family structures (and their inability to build and retain wealth), 
combined with the financial injustice grounded in the concentration of 
wealth by a few. 
Of course, the rules pertaining to family and wealth are resistant to 
change. Politically and administratively, the relationship of family to 
wealth raises difficult questions whose answers require some creativity. 
But this is a time of change. Family law has changed; demography is 
constantly changing in a way that renders existing rules inadequate; and 
new political forces, as well as scholarship, have placed the issue of 
wealth inequality at the center of debate. This offers an opportunity: 
transformative changes have already occurred, and more are achievable. 
It is worthwhile––even imperative––to put this issue at the top of the 
agenda of family law scholars and others. 
 
